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Abstract	
This paper reports the outcome of a series of interviews and focus group 
meetings with professionals working in post-trade processing and the 
provision of mutual distributed ledger services. The objective was to elicit 
and document views on three research hypotheses about the potential 
impact of mutual distributed ledger technology (‘blockchain’) on post-trade 
processing global securities markets. These hypotheses are (a) on the 
appropriate access to mutual distributed ledger; (b) on whether change 
would be piecemeal or ‘big bang’; and (c) on the extent to which applying 
mutual distributed ledger in securities settlement would require major 
changes in business processes. Our research finds that while the use of 
blockchain to validate operational data in mutual distributed ledgers can 
yield substantial reductions in both cost and risk, the concept of data 
sharing itself is far from new. Current interest in mutual distributed ledgers 
has established significant momentum, but there is a danger of building 
unrealistic expectations of the extent to which the technology on its own 
will address the underlying need for co-ordination of business processes 
both within and between firms. Achieving all the potential benefits from 
mutual distributed ledgers will require board level buy-in to a substantial 
commitment of time and resource, and active regulatory support for 
process reform, with relatively little short term payoff. (214 words) 
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1. Introduction	
Mutual distributed ledgers (aka blockchains) record transactions and ownership 
using pervasive, persistent, and permanent data structures replicated across 
numerous computers.1  The two principal technology components are public-key 
cryptography and ‘peer-to-peer’ or shared data storage.  The end result is a data 
source that is simultaneously logically ‘central’ while technically ‘distributed’ across 
the computers on the network.  The network of computers using the ledger can 
consult a single authoritative and immutable ledger of all the data transactions from 
the origin (‘genesis’) of the data structure.  Everyone has the same ‘view’ of the 
same ‘data’, though they may be retrieving the data from different physical sources.   
Nowadays the best known mutual distributed ledger is the Bitcoin ‘blockchain’. This 
provides an indelible record of all of the cryptocurrency’s transactions from when 
they first began on 3 January 2009, using a consensus process, known as ‘proof of 
work’ (Bitcoin mining) to ensuring that the thousands of active nodes on the Bitcoin 
network do indeed all have the same view of the underlying data to a very high level 
of cryptographic security. 
The term blockchain comes from the cryptographic validation of Bitcoin transactions 
in blocks that combine several transactions together (the size of these blocks varies 
a great deal but can contain a thousand transactions or more). Once a block is 
validated by proof of work then the transactions it contains are permanently and 
irreversibly recorded in the blockchain across numerous machines with no single, or 
‘master’, central record. Participants in the Bitcoin network can view the ledger 
transactions in the blockchain from thousands of different machines but always see 
the same history.    
Mutual distributed ledgers are not new but, historically, they have suffered from two 
perceived disadvantages: insecurity and complexity.  The robustness and relative 
                                            
1 In this paper we employ the following definitions. A ledger is a record of transactions; 
distributed means divided among several or many, in multiple locations; mutual is shared in 
common, or owned by a community; a mutual distributed ledger (MDL) is a record of transactions 
shared in common and stored in multiple locations; and mutual distributed ledger technology is a 
technology that provides an immutable record of transactions shared in common and stored in 
multiple locations. See Appendix 1 and also (Mainelli, 2016) for discussion of the terminology. 
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simplicity of the Bitcoin blockchain has drawn favourable comparisons with complex 
messaging and processes and the multiple requirements for storage used in most 
financial services, especially in wholesale financial markets’ securities settlement 
messaging and processes. This, along with the substantial current regulatory and 
other cost pressures on capital markets firms, have focused many in the industry on 
the possibility of achieving substantial efficiency gains by applying mutual distributed 
ledgers to securities settlement. It is though as yet unclear clear to what extent the 
robustness and simplicity of the Bitcoin blockchain can be replicated when applied to 
the varied and substantial throughput of global financial market transactions, nor 
which of the many forms of mutual distributed ledger are best suited for post-trade 
processing and to what extent they should be applied. 
Despite these uncertainties, strong claims are now being made about the potential of 
mutual distributed ledgers to reduce costs and risks and a number of initiatives 
applying mutual distributed ledger to securities settlement are now being pursued, 
attracting substantial investment from both major banks and venture capital funds. 
These employ a range of approaches.  Some directly employ the Bitcoin blockchain, 
or a simulacrum thereof.  Others employ other open source mutual distributed ledger 
software, such as Ripple or Ethereum.  Others are developing private, proprietary, or 
semi-public ledgers. The common feature – as highlighted by our preferred 
terminology ‘mutual distributed ledger’ and ‘mutual distributed ledger technology’ – is 
providing a common view of ownership and other data across many computers with 
no centralised record. 
Understanding of the technology however lags well behind the hype, amongst 
practitioners, policy makers and industry commentators alike. ‘Blockchain’ 
technology seems to promise major change for capital markets and other financial 
services – some say it may ultimately prove to be as important an innovation as the 
internet itself – but few can say exactly how or why.  
The objective of this paper is to offer some insight into the potential use of mutual 
distributed ledger for reducing costs and risks in securities settlement. The findings 
are based on engagement with practitioners in a series of structured interviews and 
two focus group meetings (supplemented by a review of extensive relevant public 
domain materials, much of which is described in an appendix). 
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Our principal contribution is investigating three ‘research hypotheses’, not 
hypotheses that can be confirmed or rejected in a statistical sense but carefully 
worded statements designed to elicit the fullest possible understanding from our 
informants of the practical detail involved in the application of blockchain to post-
trade processing. Investigating these hypotheses through extensive engagement 
with a large number of practitioners has highlighted the many challenges that will 
need to be addressed if mutual distributed ledgers are to be fully adopted in 
securities settlement. 
To provide a flavour of our findings, here are a couple of the conclusions emerging 
from our analysis. A view expressed in several of our interviews is that a root cause 
of inefficiency in post-trade processes is that the two sides to a trade each maintain 
their own separate records of the transaction and the resulting counterparty 
obligations. The consequence is the expenditure of much unnecessary resource 
reconciling this data with that held by the counterparty at each step of contract 
execution. This is one reason why mutual distributed ledgers have such appeal to 
established firms – holding out the possibility of storing all relevant operational 
information about trade executions in agreed and verified format shared by all 
participants to the trade.  
It is important to recognise however that agreement on the sharing of trade 
information can be bilateral and therefore requires neither that the actual ownership 
of securities is recorded on a mutual distributed ledger nor any of the various 
consensus mechanisms employed to ensure consistency of data on a mutual 
distributed ledger.2 Indeed from a technological perspective the fuss about 
blockchain is a little surprising since distributed databases have themselves been 
around for many years and in the securities market context the cryptographic 
advances incorporated in the Bitcoin blockchain do not add any obvious value over 
the established approaches to ensuring security widely used in financial services. 
                                            
2 Such a bilateral approach to sharing of data for improving the efficiency of post-trade efficiency 
seems to be the distinguishing feature of the ‘Corda’ software for financial services, announced in 
early April 2016 by the industry digital ledger consortium R3, but the possibility of such bilateral data 
sharing is far from new. It is also used for example in the ‘woven broadcasting’ timestamping and 
document retrieval systems of Z/Yen (see www.metrognomo.com for the States of Alderney as an 
open public service example). 
 6 
 
A related finding is that achieving all of the potential benefits of mutual distributed 
ledger is likely to be afflicted by the problem of ‘excess inertia’, a problem highlighted 
in other non-financial contexts by the research literature on technological innovation. 
This is a market failure that arises when users are ‘locked in’ to existing practice and 
as a result private profit incentives are not strong enough for individual firms to adopt 
a more efficient standard or technology, even when adoption would reduce costs for 
the industry as a whole. In the case of mutual distributed ledgers, this problem of 
private incentives is reinforced because the full benefits of using mutual distributed 
ledger appears to involve substantial (although as yet unquantified) costs in the short 
to medium term while the anticipated benefits lie largely in the relatively distant 
future. Mutual distributed ledger may struggle to compete for funding in an 
environment of limited IT budgets much of which is already committed to regulation 
and compliance.  
Our overall judgements are cautious compared to much that has been written about 
the application of mutual distributed ledgers in financial services.3 While agreeing 
that mutual distributed ledgers have considerable potential for both cost and risk 
reduction, a great deal remains to be done in order for this potential to be exploited. 
The momentum behind a shift to recording data in mutual distributed ledgers does 
however appear to provide the industry with an opportunity to harmonise business 
processes and address many long-neglected inefficiencies in post-trade and other 
financial operations.  
The paper is organised as follows: 
- Section 2 sketches the background to our work. It considers the challenge of 
cost reduction in post-trade processing, explains how mutual distributed 
ledgers such as the Bitcoin blockchain differ from traditional centralised 
recording of data and why there is now such a high level of interest in their 
application to securities settlement.  
                                            
3 Two other recent reports also emphasise the practical challenges of employing distributed ledgers in 
capital market operations are (DTCC, 2016; Euroclear & Oliver Wyman, 2016). The contents of these 
two reports are summarised in our Appendix 1. 
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- Section 3 sets out the three hypotheses that we investigated and describes 
the methods we have used to test them. A significant test of our hypotheses 
was a focus group meeting of November 2015. We provide a complete 
transcript of this meeting in Appendix 2. 
- Section 4 presents two arguments that proved useful in organising our 
analysis – the continuing need even in mutual distributed ledgers for third 
parties playing a more limited ‘notary’ role and the interpretation that we have 
found useful of distributed ledgers as a form of database technology with 
wider and more flexible access than conventional relational databases. It then 
reports findings from our main focus group and subsequent interviews.  
- Section 5 provides a few additional opinions of our own drawing on our 
extensive experience of the industry. 
- Section 6 concludes.  
There are three supporting appendices. We emphasise that it is not necessary to 
read these appendices in order to understand our conclusions or how we conducted 
our research. These appendices do though provide key supporting material and so 
will be useful to a critical reader wanting more supporting evidence for our findings. 
Appendix 1 records the range of opinions obtained from our interviews and public 
domain materials. Appendix 2 documents our principal focus group meeting. 
Appendix 3 lists a selection of the firms with whom we have engaged during our 
research, without in any way implying that they agree with our conclusions. 
2. Background	
Three separate developments have together triggered the current interest in the 
application of mutual distributed ledger to financial market transactions. The first is 
the increasing pressure on the industry to reduce costs in the constrained post-
financial crisis business environment. The second is the experience in many other 
industries of internet enabled and online commerce where centralised processing of 
data within firms moves towards to decentralised processing using agreed shared 
and often open-source protocols that can unlock substantial efficiency gains. The 
third is the technical success of cryptocurrencies, especially one particular mutual 
distributed ledger protocol, the ‘blockchain’ that records and validates transfers of the 
Bitcoin cryptocurrency. 
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Firms participating in financial markets today devote enormous amounts of resource 
to obtaining the data needed by the business, checking data records, and reconciling 
that data both internally and against the records of other firms. If the comparisons 
between securities settlement and other information based industries hold up, then 
substantial costs might be removed through the employment of mutual distributed 
ledgers in the processing of financial transactions.  
Broadridge, utilising data from Oliver Wyman and Morgan Stanley, report that costs 
in global post trade processing alone are in the range $17bn to $24bn per year.4 
These are only one part of total costs in back- and middle-office. Another major 
middle and back-office expenditure for capital market firms are know-your-client 
(KYC) and anti-money laundering (AML) compliance which come to upwards of 
$12bn per year for major capital markets participants.5 According to Oliver Wyman 
the aggregate revenues of the firms servicing the specific activities that can directly 
utilise mutual distributed ledger – clearing, securities settlement, collateral 
management and custodian services – together amount to some $40bn to $45bn.6 
Taking account of the full range of market data, risk management, mark to market 
reporting and regulatory functions can support estimates of total capital markets 
back and middle-office costs of $100bn per year or more.7 Judging by the 
experience of other industries, the open and standardised nature of mutual 
distributed ledgers may remove a large proportion of these costs, perhaps 50% or 
more.8 
                                            
4 (Broadridge, 2015). This estimate covers core post-trade processing, reference data, 
reconciliations, trade expense management, client life-cycle management, corporate actions, tax and 
regulatory reporting 
5 See (Chan & Milne, 2013) Section 5 for more detailed discussion of these costs. 
6 (Oliver Wyman, 2015) exhibit 3.  
7 This is broadly consistent with the IDC estimate that capital market firms account for about one 
quarter of total 2015  global financial Services IT external expenditure of $458 billion (International 
Data Corporation, 2015). 
8 This 50% is only a guesstimate. For comparison we made some effort to review the research 
literature on cost reduction in non-financial industries through supply chain automation (see (Yu, 
2013) for a recent review article). While such automation is widely perceived as having been crucial to 
improving efficiency and maintaining competitiveness, the research literature does not provide any 
precise quantification.  This in part because automation is pursued in order to achieve a range of 
goals - for example greater responsiveness to customer needs, more flexibility in changing product 
design, better ability to cope with supply disruptions – not just cost reduction. Perhaps most 
persuasive in the work surveyed in (Yu, 2013) are the large and sustained increases in market 
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Mutual distributed ledgers also offer opportunities for substantial reduction in 
counterparty, operational and liquidity risks. The industry has to commit large 
amounts of collateral to the hedging of counterparty risks in security and derivative 
transactions.9 The fragmentation of security operations is a factor behind the large 
spikes in ‘trade fails’ at times of market stress.10 Lack of transparency about the 
ownership of securities and their commitment in re-hypothecation together with the 
comingling of client assets proved to be a major problem in the resolution of Lehman 
Brothers International and might have been avoided through use of mutual 
distributed ledgers.11 Reducing these costs and risks is however far from being a 
new challenge. To date progress in financial services in using automated technology 
has been slow.12 What has changed recently are perceptions of the means for 
pursuing these efficiency gains. Mutual distributed ledgers are now seen as a major 
opportunity for cost and risk reduction.  
It is worth drawing a parallel with other industries where the adoption of distributed 
and standardised business models, of the kind familiar from online commerce and 
the internet, has supported simplification and efficiency improvement in the supply 
chain.13 Inputs have become standardised and commoditised and hence increasingly 
shared or outsourced. This has allowed limited management resource to focus on 
core competitive competencies. This is a further reason for interest in mutual 
distributed ledger as a means for achieving similar decentralisation and efficiency 
gains in capital market operations.  
This new perception has led to several firms developing digital ledger solutions for 
financial markets. We have paid closest attention to three of these: Digital Asset 
Holdings which is developing mutual distributed ledger solutions for a variety of use 
                                                                                                                                        
capitalisation of those firms – of 7% per annum or more relative to their competitors – investing most 
in supply chain management relative.. 
9 (Singh, 2013) reports that the increased concerns with counterparty risk and central banks 
purchases of good collateral have contributed to shrinkage in the pledged collateral market from $10 
trillion prior to Lehman crisis (end-2007) to about $6 trillion (end-2011). 
10 See (The Economist, 2011). 
11 For overview of the role of rehypothecation and commingling of assets in the Lehman failure see 
(Deryugina, 2009). 
12 The glacial pace of change reminds us of an expression that Lord Howe once claimed he heard 
Douglas Hurd say about Chinese negotiations, “Inertia can develop a momentum of its own”. 
13 See (Gospel & Sako, 2010; Herbert & Seal, 2012) for studies of consumer products and 
accounting. 
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cases;14 R3 (OR R3-CEV) which operates under a membership model, at most 
recent count involving forty two of the world’s largest global banks;15 and SETL the 
London based start-up offering its own multi-asset, multi-currency institutional 
payment and settlements infrastructure.16 
These and other mutual distributed ledger initiatives on which we focus are a 
relatively small part of a much larger wave of new financial technology (or FinTech) 
start-ups in the US, the UK and elsewhere which have been attracting considerable 
venture capital funding. Accenture report that FinTech start-ups have raised a total of 
$12.1bn dollars globally in 2014, more than three times the $4.0bn raised in 2013 
(Accenture, 2015). To date in early April 2016, over $1.1bn in cumulative venture 
capital has been raised for more than 200 Bitcoin and blockchain related ventures.17 
Appendix 1 provides a little bit more detail about these FinTech and blockchain 
initiatives. 
Alongside this boom in FinTech has been the huge recent interest in 
cryptocurrencies triggered by the success of Bitcoin. ‘Digital cash’ technologies have 
been around for more than a quarter of a century without achieving mass adoption. 
The employment of digital signatures makes it possible to record value in digital form 
– ultimately a string of 0s and 1s - confirming value, preventing double spending and 
maintaining privacy of the user.18 A key innovation of the Bitcoin protocol (Nakamoto, 
2008) and subsequent cryptocurrencies is that there is no third party issuing the 
currency or providing convertibility (a promise to pay on demand) into other forms of 
money. Bitcoin has demonstrated the practical possibility of an open mutual 
                                            
14 Their website http://www.digitalasset.com/ describes applications in syndicated lending, US 
Treasury repo and securities settlement. Digital assets announced a $60mn first round venture capital 
financing on January 22nd, 2016 with investment from ABN AMRO; Accenture; ASX Limited; BNP 
Paribas; Broadridge Financial Solutions; Citi; CME Ventures; Deutsche Börse Group; Goldman 
Sachs; IBM; ICAP; J.P. Morgan; Santander InnoVentures; The Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation; and The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc (Digital Asset Holdings, 2016). 
15 See http://r3cev.com/about/ and the press release (R3, 2015) , which announced a five person 
team who will responsible for leading joint working groups with the 30 global banks involved in the 
project and facilitating a collaborative lab environment or “sandbox” to test and validate distributed 
ledger prototypes and protocols. 
16 See https://setl.io/. SETL have recently appointed former Bank of England Executive Director David 
Walker as Chairman and are now engaged in a first round of fundraising. 
17 (Coindesk, 2015a) 
18 (Chaum, 1992) provides an accessible summary of these methods. 
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distributed ledger using its process of mutual consensus to maintain an agreed and 
irrevocable record of transactions. 
This dramatic rise of investment in FinTech has persuaded some commentators that 
banking could be on the verge of the same kind of digital disruption that has 
previously affected many other industries.19 Some go so far as to argue that Bitcoin 
and blockchain is a key part of a new ‘sharing economy’ in which all our formerly 
centralised economic institutions are displaced by decentralised alternatives, a 
fundamental innovation that will come eventually to be seen as more significant even 
than the internet itself.20 Bank of England governor Mark Carney has spoken along 
these lines, speculating that banking could be facing an ‘Uber moment’ (Edwards, 
2015), i.e. disrupted by the technology of the sharing economy in much the same 
way as Uber and other ‘peer-to-peer’ technologies have disrupted the booking of 
taxis and the provision of other services.  
The use of the term blockchain as a short hand by many of the initiative seeking to 
apply mutual distributed ledgers in capital markets has elicited some strongly worded 
criticism from the more committed proponents of Bitcoin who argue that the Bitcoin 
and its blockchain with the associated proof of work through mining are indissoluble 
and that it is quite wrong to refer to blockchain, e.g. as in “our securities settlement is 
on the blockchain” if Bitcoin is not being used to trace ownership.21 These critics 
have a point. If validation does not rely on tracing back transaction history through a 
sequential sequence of groups of authenticated transaction records, as is the case 
with many of the proposed applications of mutual distributed ledger to securities 
settlement, then they are not using a blockchain. We therefore use the more general 
term ‘mutual distributed ledger’ wherever possible since this covers various 
                                            
19 For overview of the experience of other industries see (Christensen & Raynor, 2013; Christensen, 
1997). Often this has been triggered by online competition, e.g. in retailing (Amazon), in booking of air 
travel and accommodation (Expedia, AirBnB). Increasingly mobile phone apps connect customers 
directly with suppliers of a range of services (e.g. the Uber taxi interface). 
20 (Vigna & Casey, 2016) is one lucid statement of this point of view.  (Wright & De Filippi, 2015) 
discuss the legal consequences of such a profound change in economic relationships. 
21 This controversy about the term ‘Blockchain’ echoes an earlier terminological dispute from the early 
years of relational databases when firms might claim to be using the open source ‘relational 
databasedatabase’ such as Ingres or MySQL when they were actually using a proprietary database 
such as Oracle, DBII, or Sybase. 
 
 12 
 
applications we have examined, both permissioned and unpermissioned and 
whether or not they trace transactions back to back to a genesis block. 
Still we cannot avoid using the term ‘blockchain’ altogether.  It has acquired a life of 
its own as a marketing term to communicate the excitement about the possibilities of 
decentralised processing akin to the buzz surrounding Bitcoin.  We sometimes, 
notably in the title of our paper, use the term blockchain in this way, in order to 
acknowledge the current level of excitement about these new approaches and the 
belief that they may fundamentally transform financial market operational processes. 
Our interviews and focus groups (Section 4) and our own additional analysis 
(Section 5) suggest there are many substantial barriers to achieving such 
fundamental change, but the term ‘blockchain’ is still useful for communicating the 
excitement about what can possibly be achieved from using mutual distributed 
ledgers. 
3. Hypotheses	and	Research	Methods	
Research	hypotheses	
Our review of public domain materials (Appendix 1) together with our initial 
interviews led us to focus our subsequent research on three hypotheses. These 
capture the major business questions that practitioners and commentators about the 
application of mutual distributed ledgers in securities settlement.    
1. Any mutual distributed ledger settlement of securities purchases 
(or other transactions in public financial markets) will need to use a 
‘permissioned’ ledger, in which only a limited number of approved network 
participants can propose updates of the ledger and participate in 
verification. This contrasts with permissionless mutual distributed ledgers 
(of which the ‘Bitcoin Blockchain’ is the leading example) where anyone 
can join the network and all have equal rights to propose updates to the 
ledger and participate in verification. 
This hypothesis reflects the widespread concern that the open nature of the Bitcoin 
network, which anyone can join, lacks the controls that will be necessary for obeying 
the regulatory and legal requirements of public securities trading. Although most 
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practitioners expect any ledger used in public markets to be permissioned, a range 
of different views are still consistent with this hypothesis. For example this 
hypothesis leaves open the question of which institutions are given permission to 
participate in a mutual distributed ledger and the arrangements for granting this 
permission. In any first efforts at the adoption of mutual distributed ledger for 
settlement in public financial markets, permission to participate in recording of 
ownership and consensus verification seem most likely to be restricted to the major 
banks that already act as established intermediaries. It is possible though that 
permission could be extended to other new entrants in order to promote competition, 
especially if open distributed arrangements are developed for handling the full range 
of legal and regulatory processes.  
2. The initial applications of mutual distributed ledger will be based 
on piecemeal developments, in specific situations where there is no 
established centralised security depository for recording ownership. A 
coordinated and widespread change in operational processes across all 
the major public markets for equities, bonds and other financial assets will 
only be possible in the relatively far-off future, once technical feasibility is 
established in more limited contexts. 
This second hypothesis is more contentious than the first. Many proponents are 
envisaging mutual distributed ledger as a means of achieving complete 
standardisation and hence simplification of our existing post-trade processes. This is 
seen as an attractive route to the long-standing goal of fully automated processing, 
resulting in major reductions of costs and risks. Others are putting forward much 
more specific practical proposals, aimed at improving post-trade processing of 
specific assets which are not currently held in central security depositories e.g. 
trading of syndicated loans, repo/ securities lending or insurance contracts.  
In practice we anticipate the most pronounced difference of views on our phrase 
‘relatively far-off’. Practical progress would seem to require first demonstrating 
application in specific limited contexts. Much less certain is how quickly these early 
demonstrations can be taken further and applied to post-trade processing in the 
major public markets. Also uncertain is the extent to which existing legacy 
arrangements and the challenge of coordinated processing may serve as a barrier to 
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adoption. Firms may be reluctant to start using a mutual distributed ledger alongside 
existing inefficient arrangements because this will require an interim period of 
additional expenditure before the new replaces the old. 
3. At present current participants in the settlement cycle carry out a 
bundled set of functions (verification of ownership, preparation for 
exchange including associated borrowing of securities or cash, delivery of 
value against payment) using historically developed arrangements (tiered 
accounts, fungibility of securities ownership). Obtaining the benefits from 
the application of mutual distributed ledger to securities settlement will 
require a substantial reengineering of these arrangements in which the 
positioning for settlement must be carried out prior to trade. 
This third hypothesis is closely related to the second. If Hypothesis 3 is accepted as 
correct then so must Hypothesis 2, it will then not be possible to move rapidly to 
widespread use of mutual distributed ledger for settlement in the major securities 
markets. Conversely the rejection of Hypothesis 2 implies also rejection of 
Hypothesis 3.  
Posing this as a third, separate hypothesis though seemed useful to us in order to 
distinguish two challenges to adoption of mutual distributed ledger, (a) the primarily 
technical challenges of reconciling information in different post-trade systems (the 
points raised in our discussion of hypothesis 2, which are naturally prominent to 
practitioners responsible for managing and developing post-trade operations), from 
(b) the potentially major changes in  business process which will need to be 
addressed once technical issues are resolved, especially if mutual distributed 
ledgers are used to support near-real time same day settlement. 
The importance of distinguishing technical information reconciliation challenges from 
business process changes can be seen in considering moves towards near real-time 
settlement. Under current arrangements settlement for equities typically occurs at 
time T+2 (on the morning of the second day after trade execution).22 This gives trade 
                                            
22 Actual practice is more varied than this. For example in the UK Government bonds settle on T+1 
and many money market instruments on T +0. In the US equities settlement is currently T+3, but 
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participants a full working day to position for settlement, borrowing securities or cash 
as necessary. Technical information reconciliation under T+2 or even T+1 can 
potentially be enhanced with mutual distributed ledgers.  However, near real-time 
settlement after trade based on mutual distributed ledger (T+0) would require pre-
positioning of cash or ownership prior to trade. This would be a major change to 
business processes. 
Research	methods	
The central activities were interviews and two focus group meetings held on 29 
September 2015 and 25 November 2015 at the Z/Yen offices in London.  Appendix 3 
lists firms whose staff were either interviewed, attended a focus group, or provided 
comments on drafts. The purpose of the early interviews and the first focus group 
were to obtain information about the various proposals for using mutual distributed 
ledgers in securities settlement and to frame our hypotheses as clearly as possible. 
This involved a number of preliminary interviews, mostly conducted by telephone, 
together with the October focus group with 20 attendees run under the title “Ledger 
Legends - Mutual Distributed Ledgers versus The Blockchain”.23 This focus group 
addressed issues of where tokens or coins were needed and how to define mutual 
distributed ledgers.   
Having framed our hypotheses we then tested these through a full discussion during 
our second focus group in November 2015. Because of the importance of this focus 
group in our research we reproduce in Appendix 2, in full, the transcript to this focus 
group (which was circulated to all participants for their opportunity to comment and 
amend). After this focus group we completed a first draft of the paper, which we 
circulated for comment, and conducted a number of further interviews with 
practitioners, going through our research and our findings and eliciting further 
comment.  
We acknowledge two research biases that may have influenced both the framing of 
these hypotheses and our interpretation of the focus group discussions and our 
                                                                                                                                        
there is discussion of moving to T+2. Still in all cases a move to near time settlement will involve 
major changes in business process. 
23 This title – while catchy – drew a somewhat false distinction since, as explained, all blockchains, 
including the Bitcoin blockchain, are a type of mutual distributed ledger. 
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various interviews. Michael Mainelli at Z/Yen has been involved in developing mutual 
distributed ledger applications in various contexts, both financial and non-financial 
since 1995. Alistair Milne has written extensively about the industrial economics of 
post-trade securities clearing and settlement, arguing on many occasions that the 
industry is subject to ‘excess inertia’ with the combination of co-ordination costs and 
resistance by vested interests often blocking any changes that seek to improve 
operational efficiency. Our shared predisposition to this research was from the outset 
that we have seen this kind of thing before and therefore doubted whether renewed 
efforts to re-engineer post-trade operations based on mutual distributed ledger could 
differ markedly from past introductions of new technology.  
What we have endeavoured to do is to ensure that our findings, stated in Section 4, 
are a reflection of the views on our three hypotheses obtained from our research 
informants, not a statement of our own opinions. Our personal judgements are 
contained in Section 5. 
4. Findings	
Two	general	insights	
Before setting out the findings on the three hypotheses, we first discuss two general 
insights into the business application of mutual distributed ledgers that have 
emerged from interviews and focus groups. We found it difficult to interpret the 
material from our interviews and focus groups without taking into account these two 
points: 
 In real world contexts distributed ledgers do not entirely remove the need for 
central third parties.  The central third party role narrows towards confirming 
identity and asset existence (notary function), as well as dispute resolution 
and enforcement of legal obligations. 
 
 Distributed ledgers are a form of database technology.  In order to 
appreciate their potential, as well as the barriers to their adoption, it is 
worthwhile consider carefully both similarities to and differences from the 
relational databases that have been widely used in business applications 
since the 1970s  
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The	continuing	need	for	trusted	third	parties	
Where parties interact and need to keep track of transactions and ownership they 
have often found it helpful to create a centralised ledger.  Centralised ledgers are 
found in registries (land, shipping, vehicles, tax), in securities depositories (stocks, 
bonds), libraries (index and borrowing records) and travel reservations (airlines, 
hotels and car-hire bookings) to give just a few examples.   
Centralised ledgers are traditionally overseen by a “trusted third party” (or “central 
third parties”). Trusted third parties appear in many contexts in finance: for securities 
settlement, as custodians, as payment providers, and as poolers of risk.  In most 
cases, these centralised ledgers are stored in relational database form, facilitating 
the extraction and comparison of the data they contain with that from other 
databases. 
In the context of financial transactions, trusted third parties perform three functions: 
 confirming – confirming (or ‘validating’) the existence of something to be traded 
or transacted, the legal and regulatory obligations involved and membership of 
the transaction community; 
 safeguarding – preventing duplicate or fraudulent transactions, i.e. someone 
selling the same thing twice or ‘double-spending’, or having an asset taken 
without permission;  
 preserving – holding the history of transactions to help analysis and oversight, 
and in the event of disputes. 
Major problems arise if a third party breaks the trust placed in them.24 There can be 
problems even when the trusted third party is honest. Control over access to the 
centralised ledger may also be a source of market power, allowing the incumbent or 
incumbent institutions to price at above cost and extract economic rents from users, 
a so-called ‘natural monopoly’. Much attention is given to governance of trusted third 
parties and “industry mutuals”.  Even if market power is not exploited in this way, the 
arrangements for accessing the ledger may be complex and costly, especially when 
                                            
24 While a third party may be trusted, it doesn’t mean they are trustworthy. For illustration of the consequences of 
a corrupt third party, see the ‘Ship registry skit’ in (Mainelli & Smith, 2015) Box 1, page 40. 
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the ledger infrastructure has been developed piecemeal building on legacy 
arrangements designed around particular historical technical constraints. The 
employment of mutual distributed ledgers has the potential to address these 
substantial concerns about access to traditional centralised ledgers. 
As mutual distributed ledger technology is established, it can be expected to replace 
two functions of the trusted third party: safeguarding against duplicate or fraudulent 
transactions and preserving a verifiable public record of all transactions. A distributed 
ledger though does not fully substitute for the first function of the trusted third party, 
confirming the existence of the asset (security, money or other financial or real 
asset) to be traded, compliance with regulations and the rights of those participating 
in the transaction, though it may reduce switching costs which in turn can reduce the 
potential for exploitation of market power. 
A related issue is managing rights to access the data held in a mutual distributed 
ledger.  To the extent that any institution creates data it creates some kind of value.  
An institution may wish to understand its end-to-end costs in the full cycle of 
settlement.  To do this, it will need to reuse the data it creates in settlement 
processes in a meta-analysis endeavour (using data for analysis beyond the intent of 
its original creation).  If such data is in a mutual distributed ledger, the institution 
must be able to extract it.  If the institution can extract data on what other institutions 
are doing, it may gain an advantage over them.  Attention will therefore need to be 
given to ensuring that mutual distributed ledgers are configured to allow access by 
an institution only to the data it creates, or in which it is a counterparty. This is 
though something which the application of cryptography to a distributed ledger, 
applied appropriately, deals with very effectively: as we discovered from our 
interviews and focus groups (see further discussion below) a ‘configuration file’ can 
be set up to ensure that data is revealed only to those who ought to be seeing the 
data.  
Distributed	ledgers	as	a	database	technology	
Distributed ledgers offer a specific benefit: a transparent and rapidly updated shared 
record of one single aspect of business activities. But business activities are 
inherently complex. This suggests that creating mutual distributed ledgers will be 
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only one of several steps required towards achieving the substantial potential 
reduction of middle and back office costs and risks in capital market firms. 
A mutual distributed ledger can be understood as an evolution of the computer 
databases widely used from the 1970s onward. Some key differences are 
summarised in Table 1 below.  
This table illustrates two different respects in which mutual distributed ledgers differ 
from conventional databases:  
 First, their distributed structure means data is recorded consistently in multiple 
locations. This makes them robust – they are not vulnerable to failure of a 
central server – but also creates design trade-offs that are not present in 
centralised systems, especially the need to compromise between the 
timeliness with which consistency of records is achieved and the availability of 
data across the network. This may limit application in contexts where rapid 
updating is critical e.g. in order-driven trading. 
 
 Second, their open architecture supports direct access of participants to the 
data. Instead of relying on separate specialised software (a database 
management system and associated messaging) for controlling access to and 
updating of data, a configuration file establishes the permissions for reading 
and writing of data.   
A further practical difference is that mutual distributed ledgers such as the Bitcoin 
blockchain have been developed to support the recording and communication of 
data on a simple single relationship, that of the ownership of a token or virtual 
currency. Conventional databases, in contrast, incorporate multiple relations.  For 
example a business database may have records for customers (name, address, 
email, telephone), for inventory (item, number), for transactions (date, customer, 
order description) and other items. Conventional databases therefore usually employ 
some form of Codd’s relationship database principles with each record type 
associated with a primary key that can be used to relate that record to other types of 
record.
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Table 1: Table Comparison of Database designs 
 Centralised 
Databases 
Distributed 
Databases 
Mutual distributed ledgers 
(unpermissioned) 
Mutual distributed 
ledgers 
(permissioned) 
Storage Single master Multiple copies 
 
Definition of data Multidimensional, typically using 
some approximation to the relational 
database design of Codd 
Specialised single dimensional for e.g. ownership, 
amount 
Participation Closed Open. New nodes can be 
freely added.  
New nodes added 
subject to agreement 
by core participants. 
Rights e.g. for 
updating of 
entries 
 
Governed by separate data base 
management system 
Built into the ledger protocol. Configuration file 
determines all node 
rights to decrypt/ 
update 
Validation of data Uses ‘proof of work’ or some 
weighted voting schema 
such as ‘proof of stake’ 
Typically based on 
confirmation by core 
participants 
Reconciliation of 
data 
Only necessary 
when data is 
moved. 
Iterative,  trading off consistency against availability 
Robustness Historically 
vulnerable to server 
failure 
Resilient, continues to update even with partial node availability 
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The relative simplicity of mutual distributed ledgers from the perspective of database 
design resolves one question that emerged early in our research: the issue of one, 
few, many, or multitudes. Will there be a single mutual distributed ledger for all 
securities traded in a particular market or even one global distributed securities 
ledger? Or will there instead be a plethora, one mutual distributed ledger for each 
security in each jurisdiction? Will there be further ledgers for identity, Know-Your-
Customer and Anti-Money Laundering processes?  The relatively narrow application 
of mutual distributed ledgers, at least in their most basic form tracking only one 
dimension the relationship of ownership, indicates that this is a false question.26 The 
very simplicity and openness of the ledgers means that it should be straightforward 
to combine the information from different ledgers together or to ensure simultaneous 
and matching changes in different ledgers.27 
But it is also clear that in a practical business context the data in distributed ledgers 
will have to be combined with many other sources of data in a wide range of 
business processes such as management information and financial accounts, 
performance measurement, and risk and regulatory reporting. For these purposes 
data stored in mutual distributed ledgers will still have to be extracted and transferred 
to a data warehouse, integrating data from many different operational systems. This 
in turn creates a maintenance responsibility, ensuring that the semantic definitions in 
both mutual ledgers and the various operational systems used internally by the firm 
are consistent and interpreted correctly during the process of data warehousing. The 
use of a mutual distributed database does not remove the need to confront various 
trade-offs in assembling and combining such data.  
For an illustration of the kind of processing involved, consider the non-financial 
example of a distributed electoral register i.e. a mutual distributed ledger used to 
support voting (one of the standard use cases for a mutual distributed ledger 
recording the ownership of votes and in which the permission to cast a vote can only 
be exercised by the owner of that vote). After a round of voting the data from the 
ledger could then be analysed to assess the characteristics (age, education) of 
                                            
26 This is not to say that a complex of further functionality e.g. ‘smart contracts’ cannot be built on top 
of the basic distributed ledger. 
27 (Mainelli and Smith, 2015) demonstrates several ledgers working together. 
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voters and the relationship of voter characteristics to voting choices. Extending the 
mutual distributed ledger to this further application requires confronting many of the 
same design trade-offs that arise in conventional database design. Should the voter 
characteristics be stored as part of the mutual distributed ledger or drawn instead 
from other databases? If included as part of the mutual distributed ledger then the 
ability to perform future relational analysis may be frozen, characteristics that were 
not included at the original design stage cannot be easily added. Any change in a 
mutual distributed ledger will be a major co-ordination challenge. 
If stored as a separate database then choices must be made about the design of 
every database and the primary keys and other entries that are included in order to 
conduct relational analysis. The introduction of mutual distributed ledgers in a 
practical business context will involve revisiting and, if necessary, redesigning many 
of the processes used for aggregation and reporting of financial data.  
The example of the relational analysis of a distributed electoral register is relatively 
simple. Businesses frequently need to combine information from many different 
databases. In the case of securities firms these will include for each holding inter alia 
characteristics of issuer, characteristics of owner, liens or claims on the asset, 
promised cash flows of the security, current and historical security prices and where 
necessary supplementary internal valuations and related derivative contracts. 
Routine business activity will require relational analysis on all these data items and 
more.  
Simply moving the records of ownership of a particular security from conventional 
databases, such as the security accounts held with custodian banks, onto a mutual 
distributed ledger will not of itself fundamentally change the challenges of data 
management within any large financial organisations. Indeed in the short term such a 
change could be costly requiring reengineering of many internal systems (and given 
the problems of understanding poorly documented legacy systems many years after 
their original implementation, it might be argued that the necessary evolution in 
existing systems will be prohibitively expensive). 
These differences between traditional databases and mutual distributed ledgers are 
fundamental to understanding the potential for employing mutual distributed ledgers 
in securities settlement or other business applications. A mutual distributed ledger 
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tracks one specific aspect of business information, e.g. the ownership and the 
transfers of ownership of assets, and ensures that this information is directly 
available to many users. This reduces inconsistency and delays when accessing 
common data but it does not solve all problems of business data management. 
Mutual distributed ledgers are only one step towards employing standardised and 
open information technology architectures in order to achieve the substantial 
potential reduction of middle and back office costs and risks in capital market firms.  
Detailed	research	findings	
With this background about the role of trusted third parties and about database 
design, we now turn to our detailed research findings. These turn out to be fairly 
simple and can be summarised in a few paragraphs. The simplicity of these findings, 
compared to the complexity of our initial hypotheses, is a consequence of the close 
relationship between hypotheses two and three. These are not independent. It is 
clear from our workshop and interviews that if the substantial potential gains of using 
mutual distributed ledgers for settlement are to be fully realised then it will be 
necessary to have a “A coordinated and widespread change in operational 
processes across all the major public markets” (Hypothesis 2) and this will in turn 
“Require a substantial reengineering of these arrangements” (Hypothesis 3). 
A core question is exactly what changes in operational processes will be adopted if 
and when mutual distributed ledgers are widely applied in securities settlement.  
Answering this question will be a central task for the various initiatives seeking to 
develop the application of mutual distributed ledgers in securities settlement. A major 
task will be developing consensus on the required operational changes and also 
defining the necessary standards for widespread adoption of mutual distributed 
ledger in securities settlement and in other areas of application. The Hyperledger 
Project exemplifies the kind of cross-industry collaboration that is being encouraged 
by the interest in mutual distributed ledgers, but the difficulty of attaining binding 
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industry wide agreements on business process as opposed to software solutions 
should not be underestimated.28 
Determining in detail what operational changes will need to be introduced is a matter 
of choice for industry participants in each market and beyond the scope of our own 
report. We would highlight some further points about operational changes raised in 
our focus group meetings and interviews that might usefully inform industry 
discussion. 
 In any given operational context (which will depend on instrument and 
jurisdiction) the various processes involved in a securities transaction are well 
understood by participants. Where not covered by shared documentation, 
there is detailed practitioner knowledge and documentation within individual 
firms. Developing a mutual distributed ledger to support transactions in a 
particular operational context should not therefore be so difficult, provided this 
is based on an assessment of all the trade information that need to be shared 
and accessed by various participants (for example institutional investors, asset 
managers, custodian banks, brokers, hedge funds, central counterparties and 
central securities depositories).  The content of the mutual distributed ledger 
will however still need to be mapped to the current systems in each institution.  
This is problematic because the knowledge (in detail) of the processing logic 
and data semantics is never complete, for example the way operations staff 
choose to use the services and data available in the system.  Thus in moving 
to a mutual distributed ledger there will be potentially costly mapping against 
existing systems. 
 The transfer of ownership against payment is only the final relatively 
straightforward step of the process of clearing and settlement of securities 
trades. The vast majority of resource employed in clearing and settlement is 
required for three other tasks: (i) for establishing trust before final settlement 
                                            
28 The Hyperledger Project was announced in early February 2016.  It is a collaboration between thirty 
organisations, including R3, Digital Assets and a number of major financial institutions (see Linux 
Foundation, 2016). Digital Assets, the former owners of Hyperledger which won the 2015 Innotribe 
FinTech start-up challenge  at SIBOS (see SWIFT, 2015) have donated Hyperledger to the project. 
This illustrates willingness to co-operate on open source code for mutual distributed ledgers in 
financial services, but co-operation on underlying business process may be more difficult to achieve. 
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(ensuring that the trade is agreed accurately on both sides and that 
counterparties are ready and willing to settle); (ii) for ensuring the legal validity 
of the exchange; and (iii) in dealing with the exceptions that arise when trust 
and legal validity are not established automatically through the automated 
clearing processes carried out before final settlement. Switching the ultimate 
record of ownership from central securities depositories and custodians onto a 
mutual distributed ledger does not of itself deal with these problems of trust 
and legality.  
 A mutual distributed ledger (or more likely two mutual distributed ledgers, one 
for cash, the other for securities) can be used to establish that the 
counterparties to a trade are positioned for final settlement; but at what point in 
the trade life cycle must this positioning for settlement be in place? We discuss 
this further below, in particular the choice between retaining current 
conventions, where positioning is established in several stages of post-trade 
operations involving central counterparties, custodians, commercial banks and 
central securities depositories, or a shift to near real-time settlement e.g. T+15Ꞌ 
(final settlement after 15 minutes).  
In short, a change to settlement arrangements to utilize mutual distributed ledgers or 
other forms of data sharing could require a substantial reengineering of operational 
processes. This will not be easy. The difficulties in altering established arrangements 
for settlement is illustrated by the time and resource required for moves from T+3 to 
T+2 clearing and settlement of equity trades (something only recently achieved in 
London and still under consideration in US markets) or the challenges of developing 
the T2S clearing and settlement arrangements in Europe.  
With these points in mind, we can then turn to Hypotheses 2 and 3. Hypothesis 2 
was that adoption would be through piecemeal development rather than ‘big-bang’ 
transformation. We find that the challenge of using mutual distributed ledgers in 
securities settlement is not just demonstrating technical feasibility but rather 
achieving the necessary co-ordination in reengineering business processes across 
multiple firms.  Some opportunities show promise as proof of concept, e.g. 
syndicated loans or repo, but even in these cases it is far from clear that merely 
shifting records of ownership onto mutual distributed ledger will result in much 
efficiency gain. To take the example of syndicated lending, delays in settlement 
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(which can amount to 20 days or more) arise primarily because of the legal 
complications associated with transfer of loan participations.  The need to deal with 
legal complications is not affected by the method of recording ownership data.29  
It thus appears that virtually all applications of mutual distributed ledgers on 
securities transactions will involve industry-wide change, and this requires 
leadership. It will be essential to have widespread involvement from both sides of 
each market, buy side and sell side, together with regulators (this was widely agreed 
at our November 2015 focus group). 
One question raised in the second November 2015 focus group about securities 
transactions and mutual distributed ledgers was, “is this going to be rounds of 
evangelism followed by little progress?”  To provide some further insight into this 
discussion, Figure 1 below illustrates ten generic application areas for mutual 
distributed ledgers: viz. timestamping, regulatory reporting, archiving, identity, 
wholesale payments, shared data (e.g. LEIs), deal rooms, asset transfer, asset 
maintenance, and contract execution (e.g. ‘smart’ contracts). 
The vertical axis attempts to place these generic applications in order of technical 
difficulty, the horizontal axis in order of process change difficulty.  The securities 
transaction functions can go clockwise ‘without leadership’ for quick technology wins, 
or counter-clockwise ‘with leadership’ for big process wins, or ideally both as mutual 
distributed ledgers change the data ownership and access, in turn changing the 
processes.  Securities settlement (here ‘asset transfer’) can be seen as one of the 
more challenging applications of mutual distributed ledger because it involves 
substantial change in the business process dimension along with significant change 
in technology. 
Past practice has typically involved an emphasis on changes in the vertical rather 
than horizontal dimension of Figure 1.  As one participant noted, “our industry has a 
history of incremental improvements rather than new approaches”.  Another view put 
forward in the focus group was that “there has been an historic focus on process, not 
                                            
29 In this we are reaching a rather different conclusion than the recent  report by Euroclear and Oliver  
Wyman who argue that a first priority for the industry must be to work on concrete proofs of concept 
(Euroclear & Oliver Wyman, 2016, pg 21). 
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on data”. Another similar perspective, from interview, is that unless underlying data 
quality problems are addressed, putting data on a mutual distributed ledger will 
create as many problems as it solves. So in order to use mutual distributed ledgers 
the industry may need to give much greater priority to data quality than in the past. 
 
Figure 1: Technology change and process change  
in ten potential applications of mutual distributed ledgers 
Our Hypothesis 3 was that the application of mutual distributed ledgers to securities 
clearing and settlement would require an accompanying shift in business practice to 
positioning for settlement prior to trade. Here it is necessary to distinguish two 
separate issues that are often conflated. The first issue, one that we have already 
discussed at some length, is that utilising mutual distributed ledger technologies to 
achieve efficiency gains in securities settlement (or other operational processes) 
requires harmonisation and development of business process. So yes, to some 
extent this hypothesis is confirmed, substantial accompanying shifts in business 
practice will indeed be required.  
Some commentators have argued that near real-time settlement is one of the main 
commercial benefits of adopting mutual distributed ledger technologies (see for 
example the quotation from (Masters, 2015) transcribed in Appendix 1). These 
commentators seem to be unaware of the challenges involved. It is difficult to 
overstate the scale of change in business process required for a shift to near real-
time settlement (T+15Ꞌ). Under current business practice, whether executed on own 
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account or on behalf of a client, traders do not typically have securities or cash in 
their position at the time of trade execution. The large scale netting under T+2 or T+3 
settlement (DTCC for example is currently able to reduce the volume of trades for 
final settlement through netting by approximately 97%) will no longer be possible, at 
least not at all easily, under T+15Ꞌ, although central counterparties might still be 
employed for other reasons for example ensuring counterparty anonymity. Nor will it 
be possible to make use of the algorithms provided by central securities depositories 
to sequence settlement so as to economize on gross commitment of money and 
securities. Accounting and management reporting are also affected, allowing offsets 
of daily settlement that would likely to be unacceptable under near real-time 
settlement. The necessary prepositioning would also require fundamental changes in 
the management of market liquidity. 
Some informants suggested to us that it might be possible offer a choice of time 
frame for settlement, with some market participants electing for settlement at T+15Ꞌ 
and others at say T+2, but while placing less obligations on market participants to 
change their own business models, this involves a quite different fundamental 
practical challenge, requiring some mechanism on trading venues that ensures that 
the two counterparties to every trade agree not just on the price and quantity of the 
security being traded but also on the settlement time frame.  
Even more damning for the claim that the employment of mutual distributed ledgers 
will allow near real-time settlement is that decision of whether cash and securities 
should be positioned prior to trade turns out to be a quite separate issue from the 
sharing of data. The adoption of mutual distributed ledger technologies is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for a move to near real-time settlement cycle. Mutual 
distributed ledger technology could be adopted – and yield substantial reductions in 
costs and risks – without any change in settlement times, e.g. from the current 
standard for equity trading of day T+2. Equally a shift to near real-time settlement 
could be achieved without the use of mutual distributed ledgers (this is already 
technically possible with existing centralised arrangements provided cash and 
securities are positioned prior to trade). 
This understanding that there is no close relationship between settlement times and 
the adoption of mutual distributed ledgers emerged clearly from our second focus 
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group. Delayed settlement is a design choice involving deep economic market 
structures, not least of which are leverage and liquidity. A shift to near real-time 
settlement, say a few minutes after trade will bring costs as well as benefits. Yes, it 
will economise on the commitment of cash and collateral but it will require a major 
change in business processes, with the holding of securities and cash having to be 
positioned prior to trade and greater exposure to liquidity risks. Moreover the costs of 
two day settlement are not so much the delay itself (the financial costs of tying up 
cash or collateral overnight for settlement are minor relative to overall costs of trade 
processing).30 Where more substantial costs arise is in the uncertainty about the 
timing of final settlement: trades may fail because collateral or cash is not in position, 
especially at times when market liquidity is stressed. So a much more important gain 
from applying mutual distributed ledger in securities settlement is from greater 
certainty of final settlement time rather than contraction of the period of settlement. 
Our last finding on our Hypotheses 2 and 3 is that most of our informants remain 
skeptical about the ability of the industry to agree on mutually coordinated solutions 
to operational problems.  An example is the very poor track record of the industry in 
establishing pan-industry standards for reference data on both entities and 
securities.  The global LEI (legal entity identifier) is now available as an industry wide 
standard identifier of securities market participants, but this was a regulatory initiative 
pushed through industry opposition (principally fearing a ‘natural monopoly’ on LEI 
data).31  Before the Financial Stability Board established the global LEI through fiat, 
there were many previous failed attempts to establish industry wide entity identifiers.  
Even today the industry has failed to establish agreed security identifiers, firms have 
to handle several different incompatible schemas creating considerable and 
unnecessary complexity in internal data management. Absence of standardized 
security identifiers is not, in our view, itself an obstacle to the adoption of settlement 
on mutual distributed ledgers.  Rather the opposite, this would seem to provide an 
incentive for using a mutual distributed ledger because this removes any ambiguity 
                                            
30 Overall commitment of collateral in global financial markets is large (Singh, 2013) but this is largely 
associated with the provision of initial margin for cleared derivatives trades and the financing of 
leveraged positions whether long or short, not with securities transactions per se.  
31 For description see (Chan & Milne, 2013) 
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of understanding between the two sides to a trade about the security being 
transacted. But the failure to establish such standards does illustrate how difficult it 
has been to co-ordinate the industry in the past. 
This leaves only Hypothesis 1, that mutual distributed ledgers in securities 
settlement will be ‘permissioned’ rather than ‘unpermissioned’ in order to meet with 
the unavoidable regulatory and legal requirements applied to capital market 
transactions. While, unsurprisingly, this first hypothesis was confirmed, the answer 
was rather more nuanced than we initially expected. The key insight for us was the 
availability of ‘configuration files’ for cryptographic control of access and updating 
rights to ledger participants. One of the advantages – arguably the principal 
advantage - of mutual distributed ledgers and the cryptographic methods they 
employ is that they provide a precisely defined but flexible control over access to 
shared data. This means that the choice about permissioning is not a simple yes/no 
or in/out decision. There are a wide range of possibilities about access and 
administrative privileges for a wide range of potential participants. So, while the 
hypothesis is essentially correct, careful thought needs to go into determining the 
permissioning environment and ensuring the flexibility for changing and updating 
when necessary. 
Further	applications	including	smart	contracts	
To complete our findings, we mention some further applications of mutual distributed 
ledger in capital markets that came up in our interviews and focus group discussions, 
even though these lie beyond the primary scope of this report.  Our research has 
focused on the application of mutual distributed ledgers in securities settlement. But 
there are many other examples of potential cost reduction in capital markets 
resulting from employing mutual distributed ledgers to hold shared data. One is in 
KYC/ AML compliance. Using the global LEI as a standard identifier in a distributed 
KYC ledger could substantially reduce the billions of dollars required for KYC/ AML 
compliance. Another is using a distributed KYC ledger in OTC derivatives markets. 
Our interviews and discussions briefly explored the application of so-called ‘smart 
contracts’ in mutual distributed ledgers.  Mutual distributed ledgers need not just hold 
data, they can also contain code and this code can be used for automated 
processing on the ledger whenever certain pre-defined conditions are met. There is 
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therefore much interest in the possibility of using mutual distributed ledgers to 
automate currently costly security processes. Examples include removing much of 
the cost of corporate actions for custodian banks that manage security holdings on 
the part of the investors, for the automation of fund portfolio allocations following 
trades executed on behalf of asset managers or in the context of international trade 
finance or domestic invoice financing. 
For several interviewees and focus group participants, the most exciting business 
applications of distributed ledgers are from the employment of smart contracts to 
achieve a high degree of automation in shared inter-organisational processes and 
transactions with verified matching and execution of instructions. Much of the costs 
in the industry are associated with process incompatibilities that have to be manually 
reconciled. Once records and processing in data storage and business systems are 
consistent across firms, then the potential for considerable efficiency gains are 
unlocked. That said, while ‘smart contracts’ clearly require that firms  introduce 
processes for sharing of data to ensure consistency, it is less clear that this sharing 
has to be through a mutual distributed ledger. Data sharing to support smart 
contracts could just as well be bilateral rather than through a mutual distributed 
ledger and the employment of smart contracts might actually precede the adoption of 
mutual distributed ledgers. 
That said, most focus group participants seemed to feel that at least in the near term 
‘dumb short contracts’ would prevail over ‘smart long contracts’.  There were three 
primary opinions supporting this feeling.  First, if an executable contract has a life of 
a day or so, then the mutual distributed ledger is not open to long-term sabotage or 
disruption.  Second, most realistic smart contracts seemed to rely on the existence of 
persistent external data sources which means the contracts become complicated 
quickly, or wind up relying on human arbitration, rather defeating their purpose.  
Third, smart contracts that involved payments would require posting collateral to be 
completely automated.  This locking-up of collateral would lead to a serious 
reduction in leverage and pull liquidity out of markets.  Markets might become more 
stable, but the significant reduction in leverage and consequent market decline 
would be strongly resisted by market participants. 
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A final point about smart contracts is their legal status: the ideal for promoting 
automated execution is that the legal contracts are expressed in the same 
executable code of the smart contract in the mutual distributed ledger. In practice, as 
smart contracts are applied it is likely that a manual process of converting legal 
contracts into executable code will be needed.  These ‘automated’ contracts will 
provide overrides for arbitration, expert determination, and mediation which will be 
tempting for a disadvantaged party to invoke.  Over time this could become quite 
standardised, but in the initial stages this could create further barriers to their 
widespread application.32   
5. The	Emperor’s	Old	Clothes?	
This section records somewhat more subjective views (i.e. our own views not directly 
supported by our interviews and focus group meetings). These can be summarised 
in our section title: ‘The Emperor’s Old Clothes’. The potential for mutual distributed 
ledgers to transform securities settlement is real (in contrast to the new clothes of the 
Emperor in the Hans Christian Andersen’s tale). Capital markets, like many other 
financial services, rely on operational data, and where this can be agreed and 
shared this can yield substantial improvements in transparency and ease of data 
access.  The ‘logically central, physically distributed’ architecture of mutual 
distributed ledgers is probably the most powerful available means by which efficiency 
gains in securities transaction lifecycles can be achieved. 
‘Emperor’s Old Clothes’ emphasises our view that the principal challenges involved 
in applying distributed ledgers to securities settlement or other financial applications 
are not new. Opportunities for sharing data through distributed databases have been 
around for years. The current interest in mutual distributed ledger technology 
represents a real opportunity for change. But there is a danger of building unrealistic 
expectations of the extent to which this technology will, on its own, address the 
                                            
32 We have further evidence of this point from a February 2016 ‘distributed futures’ meeting hosted by 
Z/Yen at which lawyers, arbitrators and industry specialists, explored arbitration, mediation, and 
expert determination for mutual distributed ledgers (the website for these meetings can be found here 
http://www.zyen.com/events/distributed-futures.html ).  The conclusion of that meeting was that such 
intervention mechanisms, as well as ‘legal jurisdiction’ would need to be ‘written into’ so-called smart 
contracts for the foreseeable future. Completely automated contracts embedded in mutual distributed 
ledgers still seem some way off. 
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underlying need for coordination of business processes both within and between 
firms.  
This is not at least yet how most public authorities regard mutual distributed ledgers. 
The principal concern for regulators when confronted with cryptocurrencies or other 
novel financial products and services has been ensuring the effectiveness of the 
regulatory perimeter, i.e. making sure that these innovations do not allow firms to 
offer competing services without appropriate regulation that might undermine either 
prudential safety or customer protection. Regulators are naturally cautious: the 
memory is still fresh in their minds of the role played by lightly regulated US dollar 
‘shadow banking’ in the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
What seems to be less well accepted by regulators in most jurisdictions is a 
responsibility for supporting the adoption of new technologies, especially in relation 
to the promotion of common standards.33 We perceive a ‘siloed’ attitude towards 
technology amongst many regulators – as the preserve of a few specialists charged 
with the responsibility of developing regulation of innovative activities – and a failure 
to recognise the potential benefits of technology for improving the cost-effectiveness 
of regulation.  An exception is some of the smaller regulatory entities, for example 
the Channel Islands led by the states of Jersey and Alderney, perceive large 
potential gains from positive regulatory support for distributed ledgers.34 
Two fundamental features of a distributed ledger, i.e. persistence and 
pervasiveness, make them ideal for providing a regulator with a full transaction 
record for both oversight and recovery in the case of a systemically important 
financial institution failing, or for account portability and competition. Basing 
regulatory reporting requirements on mutual distributed ledgers can greatly reduce 
the compliance costs of regulatory reporting (the obvious example being the failure 
of trade repositories for reporting of OTC derivative transactions, not being based on 
                                            
33 The analysis of this paragraph draws on (Houstoun, Milne, & Parboteeah, 2015). 
34 See (States of Jersey, 2015) 
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mutually agreed standards they have imposed great costs on industry while at the 
same time yielding little useable information to regulators).35  
It also seems to us that one way for policy makers to encourage the adoption of 
mutual distributed ledgers will be for central banks to take a lead role, by moving the 
ownership of the central bank reserves used for final settlement of large value and 
possibly even retail payments onto a distributed ledger.36 By making this (significant) 
change central banks could substantially lower the barriers to entry in payments and 
related activities and hence take a major step towards supporting the use of mutual 
distributed ledger in settlement of securities, foreign exchange and money market 
transactions.37 
We also point out that the business models of numerous institutions are potentially 
threatened by the introduction of shared records of ownership and transactions. 
These include for example, broker dealers that execute trades and provide credit 
and security services to clients and also custodian banks. The implications of the 
adoption of mutual distributed ledgers for competition and economic power 
structures requires more research, but we do think that full senior management buy-
in to mutual distributed ledgers will only happen after taking account of the 
implications for their competitive positioning and may not happen at all without 
addressing the incentives and cultures that drive decision making in major financial 
institutions. Ultimately there may be a need – perhaps under regulatory and 
shareholder pressure – for firms to take a wider and longer term ‘whole market’ 
perspective rather than focusing on their own short term individual bottom line. 
                                            
35 For more detailed discussion see (Houstoun et al., 2015) 
36 A number of central banks are looking at the possibility of the issue of their reserves on distributed 
ledger, and potentially going even further by allowing non-bank holdings of those reserves as a 
means of payment substituting for central bank notes. Such developments are mentioned in recent 
speeches and interviews by officials from the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada and the Peoples 
Bank of China (Haldane, 2015; Wilkins, 2015; Xiaochuan, 2016). See also (Milne, 2016) for analysis 
of the economics of central bank issuance of a cryptographic currency as the ultimate settlement 
media.  Doing so however raises an number of concerns about security, risk and regulation (see 
Committee on Payment Systems and Market Infrastructures, 2015; Richards, 2016) and no 
immediate steps of this kind are envisaged.  
37 Some mutual distributed ledger initiatives – for example the London based start-up SETL – are 
focussing first on providing a distributed ledger for the gross settlement of real-time payments. 
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As a final point in this section we think it useful to draw an analogy between mutual 
distributed ledgers in securities settlement and the original adoption of computerized 
recording of securities ownership following the paperwork crisis in New York markets 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Then the sheer scale of practical challenge, with 
settlement delays of six weeks or more, forced the US industry into fully rethinking its 
operational processes. This led eventually to the dematerialization of securities 
holdings and the creation of DTCC, along with the accompanying changes to 
securities laws and regulations, and underpinned the subsequent remarkable 
explosion in speed and volume of securities trading. 
The current interest in ‘blockchain’ is perhaps best viewed as one aspect in a much 
broader strategic challenge to the entire financial services industry since the global 
financial crises from 2007. The industry may – over the next five to ten years – need 
to completely re-think its infrastructure in order for more participants to distribute 
more products to more people, shifting from limited participation with relatively high 
margins to more competitive and low margin. The industry needs to build an 
integrated view of all transactions and business processes and the supporting data 
on ownership, collateral, and risk.  In line with movements such as open government 
data, this data sharing will be on an open and shared basis rather than a closed 
proprietary basis. ‘Open, shared, data’ might not appear to be in the immediate 
shareholder interest of current financial institutions, but from a longer term 
perspective, improving the efficiency of intermediation in global financial markets 
should benefit almost all investors.  
While the operational costs and challenges have not yet mounted to the point where 
they threaten to undermine the trading processes, there is once again today an 
opportunity for collectively rethinking post-trade processing in global capital markets. 
If we were to start with a blank piece of paper and draw up the most efficient 
possible operational arrangements what would they be? Mutual distributed ledger 
technology does seem to offer the possibility of a step change in new processes, 
allowing the industry to move from present fragmentation and inefficiency to more 
automated, safer and more efficient operations. But we believe it is a chimera to 
believe that this change will come through competition from technological innovators 
alone. Just as half a century ago DTCC required collaboration of the entire industry, 
so too with mutual distributed ledgers for specific process areas.  There needs to be 
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a clear-sighted focus on the necessary investments and the potential long term 
gains, from both senior management on the buy-side and sell-side of the market and 
senior regulators. Otherwise the much heralded ‘blockchain’ revolution may 
disappoint. 
6. Summary	and	Conclusions	
This paper reports the outcome of a series of interviews and focus groups, eliciting 
and documenting views of market professionals on the potential impact of 
‘blockchain’ (or in our preferred terminology ‘mutual distributed ledgers’) on the post-
trade clearing and settlement of securities trades. Many have argued that the 
employment of mutual distributed ledgers can substantially reduce the high costs of 
post-trade processing. There are no definitive figures, but these costs are in excess 
of $40bn per year on securities clearing and settlement alone, much of which arises 
in data reconciliation and in manual intervention in operational processes. Once the 
costs of other processes – KYC, AML, corporate actions and in asset management – 
are taken into account it appears that mutual distributed ledger technologies applied 
across the full range of securities activities could save the industry many tens of 
billions of dollars per year. 
We investigated three research ‘hypotheses’ (carefully worded statements designed 
to elicit as much information as possible from our interviews and focus group 
meetings). The first was on whether access to distributed ledgers used in global 
financial markets need to be ‘permissioned’ with only a limited number of approved 
network participants (the alternative being the use of ‘unpermissioned’ ledgers such 
as the Bitcoin blockchain in which anyone is allowed to participate). While, 
unsurprisingly, this first hypothesis was confirmed, the answer was rather more 
nuanced than we initially expected. The key insight for us is the availability of 
‘configuration files’ for cryptographic control of access and updating rights to ledger 
participants. One of the advantages – arguably the principal advantage – of mutual 
distributed ledgers and the cryptographic methods they employ is that they provide a 
precisely defined but flexible control over access to shared data. 
The views of practitioners yielded less clear cut responses to our remaining two 
hypotheses. The two main issues raised in these hypotheses were: first whether the 
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adoption of mutual distributed ledgers needed to be developed first in specific 
situations, establishing ‘proof of concept’ by apply the new technology in contexts 
where there is currently no centralised security depository for recording ownership; 
and second that the widespread adoption of mutual distributed ledgers, and full 
exploitation of their potential for cost reduction, will require a substantial 
reengineering of the arrangements for clearing and settlement.  
Our principal finding on these remaining two hypotheses is that if the substantial 
potential gains of using mutual distributed ledgers for settlement are to be fully 
realised then it will be necessary to have a “A coordinated and widespread change 
in operational processes across all the major public markets” (Hypothesis 2) and this 
will in turn “Require a substantial reengineering of these arrangements” (Hypothesis 
3). 
Our interviews and focus groups proved less than supportive of the idea that 
progress in the adoption of mutual distributed ledgers in post-trade securities 
processing can be pursued simply by developing proof of concept through 
demonstrating application in some specific practical contexts or where for example 
there is not yet any centralised recording of ownership. It is not clear that there are 
easy wins.  Wherever mutual distributed ledger is applied it has to be accompanied 
by substantial changes in operational arrangements, both for the completion of 
trades and for associated tasks, for example collecting, warehousing and analysing 
of data for management reporting. The challenge of using mutual distributed ledger 
in securities settlement is not just demonstrating technical feasibility but rather 
achieving the necessary co-ordination in reengineering business processes across 
multiple firms. 
Our interviews and (Section 4) and accompanying analysis (Section 5 and Appendix 
1) point to four further conclusions: 
1. Achieving reductions of cost and risk in securities transactions is far from a 
purely technological challenge. This challenge is to a much greater extent a 
matter of reengineering business processes. The extent of desired change 
needs to be carefully assessed. To take one example, many argue for the 
adoption of mutual distributed ledgers in order to bring about near real-time 
settlement (T + 15 minutes instead of the current T+2 days for equities 
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trades). But this is fundamentally confused. Existing centralised settlement on 
central securities depositories already support virtually instantaneous 
settlement once all the preparations such as positioning of securities and cash 
are completed. Near real-time settlement can be achieved simply by requiring 
all these steps to be taken prior to trade. Moving settlement onto distributed 
ledgers does not make any difference. 
2. Applications of mutual distributed ledgers will have to mesh with existing 
practice and process, for example in database design, data management, and 
regulatory and business responsibilities of the various financial market 
participants.  So yes, there are major opportunities for reducing costs and 
risks in the securities lifecycle, but this will be through a process of improving 
not just the underlying recording of ownership and obligations but also the 
accompanying business processes. This point emerges most strongly above 
Section 4 in our analysis of mutual distributed ledgers as a form of database 
and the business requirement to analyse (for management reporting, 
accounting an audit, risk management and other purposes) ‘meta data’ 
combining information from a number of databases. This in turn means that 
adoption of mutual distributed ledgers will need a range of different business 
processes and data sources need to be adapted in a coherent way. The scale 
of change to see effective and widespread adoption is therefore large. 
3. One respect in which mutual distributed ledgers offer advantages over more 
traditional centralised record keeping is in supporting flexible control over 
rights to access and update data (rights which can be easily altered by 
amending configuration files).  There is also great interest in the associated 
but separate technology of ‘smart contracts’ (though in our opinion this will 
only be fully realised over the long-term), embedded code that can support 
much greater process automation. These features can in turn support greater 
commonality of business process, allowing the exploitation of economies of 
scale through the separation and outsourcing or sharing of process between 
firms. But as we have already emphasised these technologies – while 
increasingly convenient to use – are not fundamentally new.  
4. There are different ‘visions’ of how distributed ledger will eventually be applied 
in securities settlement.  These visions range from relatively modest bilateral 
evolution, to agreement on wider sharing and recording of ownership in a 
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number of specific markets, to long term market-wide transformation 
accompanied by a complete transformation of existing institutional 
arrangements.  The full benefits of mutual distributed ledgers require the more 
radical transformation, building global markets on simpler, more open data 
systems.  By providing logically central, physically distributed, and mutual 
data ownership, mutual distributed ledgers eliminate many inefficiencies.  As 
well as cost reductions this will yield further significant benefits in terms of 
greater competition and reduced margins, customer protection and the 
monitoring of prudential and systemic risk. However, such extensive change 
could meet resistance from entrenched practices and vested interests and a 
substantial problem of ‘excess inertia’ which means that achieving the full 
potential of the technology will require a concerted and co-ordinated industry 
wide effort. It will not come about simply by leaving the choice of technology 
‘to the market’. 
To conclude, yes, this new technology shows real promise – but this promise will not 
come automatically, easily or cheaply.  Extracting the full potential value from mutual 
distributed ledgers and smart contracts will require widespread change in business 
processes and up-front investment by virtually all firms. Agreeing this level of 
expenditure will require engagement and commitment at board level across both the 
buy side and sell side of the industry. Regulators will also have to play an active 
rather than passive role, for example requiring the adoption of shared data 
arrangements for regulatory reporting or putting central bank reserves used for final 
settlement of cash payments onto a mutual distributed ledger. The return will then 
come from substantial improvements in operational efficiency and access to financial 
services that can be enjoyed for many years to come. 
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Appendix	1. Public	domain	materials	
In this Appendix we review some of the sources we have found most useful in writing 
this report and take the opportunity to discuss additional issues concerning the 
potential application of distributed ledgers in financial services (not just in securities 
settlement).  
Our	own	previous	work.		
This report builds on a substantial body of our own previous research, stretching 
bank many years, on distributed ledgers, securities settlement and other related 
topics. The work of Michael Mainelli and his colleagues on mutual distributed ledgers 
can be accessed via the Z/Yen website, via http://www.zyen.com/what-we-
do/mutual-distributed-ledgers.html. Z/Yen first did work on distributed ledgers – in a 
non-financial context – as long ago as 1995. Their other projects include InterchainZ 
(completed) and IntereXchainZ (ongoing) which have explored the application of 
distributed ledgers in financial services with Z/Yen’s industry partners, the Distributed 
Futures meetings on the application of distributed ledger 
(http://www.zyen.com/events/distributed-futures.html) and their work on distributed 
ledgers in insurance (von Gunten & Mainelli, 2014 and ongoing further research). 
Alistair Milne has written many research papers over the past fifteen years on 
financial infrastructure (retail payments, securities clearing and settlement and 
technology standards). His recent work on standard setting in global capital markets 
is at http://www.financialstandards.lboro.ac.uk/index.html Other older papers can be 
found via SSRN http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=148057  
and https://ideas.repec.org/f/pmi529.html (there are many other papers on bank 
capital and financial regulation, so scroll down for work on retail payments, the global 
LEI, common language in financial markets and securities settlement.) 
Coming as we both do from a background of industry practice and regulatory policy, 
is one reason why we take the position that distributed ledgers are not really so new. 
We believe that distributed ledgers are best viewed as just another database 
technology, albeit one making clever use of cryptography to provide flexible but 
secure distributed access. Most of the cryptography that underpins the 
authentication and permissioning of ledger participants and the validation of ledger 
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entries has been around for almost four decades.  The peer-to-peer distributed 
architecture has been around in various forms for over two decades.  The novelty is 
the relatively recent recognition, triggered in no small part by the publicity and debate 
over Bitcoin, of the potentially transformative impact of distributed ledgers providing 
a common and agreed record of data in many different applications, both financial 
and non-financial. 
Terminological	disputes:	what	is	a	distributed	ledger?	
One problematic issue is that the many contributors to current debate about the 
practical application of blockchain or distributed ledger technologies have not yet 
settled on an agreed terminology. The same terms can be used to mean different 
things or different terms to mean the same thing.  
Our preferred terminology (from Mainelli, 2016 and restated in footnote 1 above) is 
as follows. A ledger is a record of transactions; distributed means divided among 
several or many, in multiple locations; mutual is shared in common, or owned by a 
community; a mutual distributed ledger (MDL) is a record of transactions shared in 
common and stored in multiple locations; and a mutual distributed ledger 
technology is a technology that provides an immutable record of transactions 
shared in common and stored in multiple locations.  
A recent UK Government Office for Science Report provides an alternative and also 
useful definition: 
“A distributed ledger is … an asset database that can be shared across a network of 
multiple sites, geographies or institutions. All participants within a network can have 
their own identical copy of the ledger. Any changes to the ledger are reflected in all 
copies in minutes, or in some cases, seconds. The assets can be financial, legal, 
physical or electronic. The security and accuracy of the assets stored in the ledger 
are maintained cryptographically through the use of ‘keys’ and signatures to control 
who can do what within the shared ledger. Entries can also be updated by one, 
some or all of the participants, according to rules agreed by the network.” 
(Government Office for Science, 2016, page 5) 
This same report provides some useful distinctions (ibid, page 17-18). A traditional 
ledger has one central or master copy (as we have discussed in Section 4, this 
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requires a trusted third party to maintain the ledger). A distributed ledger is a type of 
data base that is spread across multiple sites, countries or institutions with no single 
central copy. They also prefer ‘block chain’ i.e. two separate words to ‘blockchain’, 
we adopt the latter, more common, usage though arguably from the perspective of 
English language usage block is a modifier of chain and should therefore be a 
separate word. 
A blockchain is one type of shared database that takes a number of records and 
combines them together in a block which is then ‘chained’ to the next block (using of 
course a cryptographic validation of the link). Each block of the chain needs to be 
validated i.e. agreed by some process of consensus amongst the network 
participants. Bitcoin ‘mining’ is one way of achieving this consensus, through 
expenditure of real resources (electricity) on searching for the cryptographic key that 
validates the block. A number of other consensus algorithms (many are based on 
some kind of voting) are possible. 
There is also not yet terminological agreement on whether a blockchain is also a 
distributed ledger. In this report we consider blockchains as one form of distributed 
ledgers. The Government Office for Science report prefer to define a distributed 
ledger as one in which entries are added and validated one by one rather than in 
blocks, so in their terminology a blockchain is not a distributed ledger. They also 
prefer the term ‘shared ledger’ (originating with Richard Gendal Brown) as a general 
term to describe all ledgers with that are shared by an industry or consortium.  
Figure 2, created by Consult Hyperion, provides a more detailed breakdown of 
different types of ledgers, highlighting the distinction between unpermissioned 
ledgers (anyone can use them) and permissioned ledgers, and also some of the 
possibilities for maintaining (in our terminology validating) ledger entries. 
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Figure 2: a classification of different ledgers (Consult Hyperion, https://www.flickr.com/photos/32714731@N05/24489055235/ )
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Finally note that we use the additional qualifier mutual distributed ledgers, in order to 
distinguish ledgers that offer equal access and ownership to a number of firms 
and/or individuals from ledgers which are maintained and accessed on a distributed 
basis within a particular organisation. Mutual distributed ledgers may be limited to a 
selected group or fully public with anyone entitled to use them. 
The	boom	in	FinTech	and	blockchain.	
We have reported above, in Section 2, that that FinTech start-ups have raised a total 
of $12.1bn dollars globally in 2014 and over $1.1bn in cumulative venture capital has 
been raised for Bitcoin and blockchain related ventures. Accenture summarise the 
strategic challenge: “It is clear that the digital revolution in financial services is under 
way, but the impact on current banking players is not as well defined. Digital 
disruption has the potential to shrink the role and relevance of today’s banks, and 
simultaneously help them create better, faster, cheaper services that make them an 
even more essential part of everyday life for institutions and individuals. To make the 
impact positive, banks are acknowledging that they need to shake themselves out of 
institutional complacency and recognise that merely navigating waves of regulation 
and waiting for interest rates to rise won’t protect them from obsolescence.” 
(Accenture, 2015) 
These ventures have focused on five areas: payments instruments and processes; 
data analytics; capital markets technologies; bank credit and corporate financial 
information; and personal financial management.38 Some are radical alternatives to 
existing financial services. Many are evolutions of existing practice and are often 
eventually bought out by incumbent firms. 
New financial tech-based (FinTech) firms have already been successful in attracting 
certain lines of business away from established banks, mostly in commercial banking 
rather than capital markets activities. Examples include mobile and internet 
payments, unsecured P2P personal lending (or ‘market place lending’ as it is 
referred to in the US), retail foreign exchange and invoice financing (for a recent 
survey see The Economist, 2015). The major disruption to date in capital market 
                                            
38 (Accenture, 2015) 
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transactions has been in the front, not back, office, with a substantial share of trading 
now undertaken by standalone high frequency trading firms rather than humans 
executing client orders and the emergence of new investment strategies based on 
‘big data’ (exploiting data from social media platforms).   
There is an immense amount of online coverage of the many Bitcoin and blockchain 
ventures. www.coindesk.com covers most of this activity. The activities of these 
start-ups include Bitcoin mining, Bitcoin wallets, payments solutions build on Bitcoin 
as well at those using the Bitcoin blockchain as a tool for validation of other 
transactions i.e. this venture capital funding is being provided both to Bitcoin 
companies and Blockchain companies. Some seek to use the Bitcoin blockchain to 
support securities settlement, for example using a so called ‘coloured coin’ approach 
in which the Bitcoin blockchain is used only for recording of verified transactions and 
becomes a permissioned system for this particular application because it is not open 
to all members of the Bitcoin network.39 Alongside this are many other announced 
initiatives seeking to develop some form of securities settlement application using 
mutual distributed ledgers but not the Bitcoin blockchain.  
We have not attempted to review all of the announcements about the application of 
distributed ledger to securities settlement (there are very many as exemplified by the 
now quite bewildering montages of different logos presented at industry conferences 
and in consultancy reports).40 Many can be characterised as ‘vapourware’ – 
announcements of a product without both a fully functioning product and an 
established client base. It is difficult to assess which of the many initiatives in the 
market place are to be taken seriously.  
What we have found useful is to identify three main groups of initiatives that seem to 
be making a serious effort to develop solutions applicable to the settlement of 
securities trades and other financial transactions. 
                                            
39 For a summary of this approach see (Lykke, 2016). It is though questionable whether the transfer of 
such ‘coloured Bitcoins’ can ever be accepted as a  legally final transfer of financial assets without a 
subsequent process of clearing and settlement outside of the blockchain (see Swanson, 2015b). 
40 One attempt at such an overview is (Harris, 2015) 
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1. The first are using newly developed blockchain technologies in a specific 
business context. This is exemplified by Nasdaq who have applied a 
blockchain technology to support settlement in ‘pre-IPO’ (or grey market) 
trading.41 This particular initiative employs the ‘coloured’ Bitcoin approach, 
linking securities to small value fractioners of a bitcoin which can then be 
settled through a transaction.    
2. The second are developing radical alternatives to existing market 
arrangements, developing technical solutions for issuing securities in 
cryptographically secured digital form and trading them securely on a shared 
platform, with the hope of breaking down some of the barriers to entry in 
financial market trading. Examples include t0, the subsidiary of the online 
retailer Overstock and Symbiont.42 While many of these are technologically 
impressive these start-ups have yet to demonstrate that any substantial 
adoption by established market participants. 
3. The third group are working closely with established market participants. The 
three initiatives to which we have examined most closely Digital Asset 
Holdings, R3 and SETL fall into this category;43 as does the work on mutual 
distributed ledgers of Z/Yen.44  
Those working on blockchain as a radical alternative to existing financial market 
arrangements sometimes view with suspicion those initiatives working closely with 
established firms, concerned that these are protecting vested interests and 
protecting the privately profitable but socially damaging practices of the major 
financial market firms. See for example the reported criticism by Overstock CEO 
Patrick Byrne of R3 at a 2015 blockchain conference.45 The view suggested by our 
own work is though that – due to the operational complexities of securities settlement 
– only initiatives that are working closely with established firms are likely to have any 
chance at all of achieving widespread adoption, and even these may well fail. The 
notion that the novel technology offered some blockchain startup can capture the 
                                            
41 (Prisco, 2015) 
42 See (Rizzo, 2015a, 2015b) 
43 See footnotes 14.-16. for more detail. 
44 See http://www.zyen.com/what-we-do/mutual-distributed-ledgers.html  
45 Reported in (Das, 2015). 
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bulk of global financial market settlement, becoming the Apple or Facebook of global 
finance, transforming post-trade operations for the social good and enjoying massive 
profits is simplistic. As we have argued the challenge of applying mutual distributed 
ledger in securities settlement is only to a small degree about the technology, it is 
largely about the adoption of co-ordinated and standardised business processes.  
Nonetheless we believe there is a genuine concern that established firms, focused 
on short term returns, will not do enough to exploit the full potential for using mutual 
distributed ledger technologies to increase the efficiency of post-trade operations. 
We can draw support on this point from the substantial research literature on the 
economics of network innovation, especially in relation to the problem of ‘excess 
inertia’.46 Some industries, for example mobile telephony or internet commerce, are 
characterised by rapid and sometimes disruptive technical change. In others though– 
and this applies to most financial services – technological innovation adopted in 
isolation does not provide firms with a competitive advantage, and instead a co-
ordinated and agreed adoption of a new technology is required. In this situation the 
private incentives for adoption are weak.47 This is a form of market failure and public 
policy intervention may be required to promote technological innovation. 
We also comment on one more radical view, ably documented for example by (Vigna 
& Casey, 2016), that cryptocurrencies and blockchain will prove to be as 
economically and socially important as the internet ushering in a new era of 
decentralised exchange without the need for large institutions and minimal central 
oversight. This seems to us somewhat oversimplified. A quotation from their book 
will give an idea of this perspective on blockchain 
“Is a clash building between these two movements, the corporate world’s 
concentration of wealth and power, and Silicon Valley’s reempowerment of 
                                            
46 Many references can be provided, for example (David & Greenstein, 1990; David & Steinmueller, 
1994; Farrell & Saloner, 1986; Swann, 2009). (Milne, 2006) makes the excess inertia argument for the 
retail payments industry. 
47 An alternative outcome for such a ‘co-ordination game’ is that there is first slow adoption of 
innovation, and then a tipping point, after which adoption is very rapid. There are examples of such 
tipping points in financial services, the most well known the capture of the trading in the Bund futures 
contract from LIFEE by the Eurex exchange described in (Cantillon & Yin, 2008), but this is an 
unusual case. Our judgement is that this cannot happen in securities settlement because it is so 
difficult for alternative technologies to co-exist. 
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the individual? Perhaps these trends can continue to exist if the 
decentralising movement remains limited to areas of the economy don’t 
bleed into the larger areas that Big Business dominates. But that’s not 
what the proponents of this technology forsee – especially those in the 
cryptocurrency sector. They believe that decentralisation is just getting 
started and that the centralised economic and political establishments – 
even governments and nation-states, those ultimate centralized loci of 
power – will be disrupted by it. If so, cryptocurrencies and blockchain 
technology could ride that wave triumphantly.” (Vigna & Casey, 2016 pp 
277-278)  
Yes, a shift to greater decentralisation in financial exchange may be possible and 
could yield substantial economic benefits in terms of much reduced costs and 
efficiency also wider access to financial services. But – paradoxically – to overcome 
the vested interest of many existing institutions that stand to lose market position and 
margin from such developments, such a decentralisation will require a focused and 
vigorous centralised action by regulators and other public authorities to remove 
barriers to the adoption of the new technology. The full potential of mutual distributed 
ledgers in securities settlement and other financial services will not come about 
through the free play of market forces alone. 
An illustration of this point is that the major disruption that has so far affected global 
capital markets – the fragmentation of exchange venues and the associated rise of 
high frequency trading and of proprietary dark pools – was in fact the product of 
regulatory intervention. The transformation of equity trading – which has done a 
great deal to reduce transaction costs although also exposed the market to that new 
forms of computer driven instability the ‘flash crash’ and introduced new concerns 
about some market participants having advantages of speed and location that allow 
them to exploit others – would not have taken place without Reg-NMS in the United 
States and MIFID in Europe creating the possibility of competition between trading 
venues. 
Without such policy intervention the most likely outcome is that the new providers of 
mutual distributed ledger services such as Digital Assets, R3, SETL and others, 
following the path of least resistance, will focus on services for which there is a clear 
 54 
 
interest from established firms. This may mean for example that the challenge of lack 
of co-ordination of data between firms is tackled on a bilateral basis, through 
something similar in the post-trading context of the ISDA master agreements used 
for OTC derivative trading. An early indication of this is the recent release of 
information about the R3 platform “Corda” in (Brown, 2016) who notes amongst 
other attributes that “Corda has no unnecessary global sharing of data: only those 
parties with a legitimate need to know can see the data within an agreement. Corda 
choreographs workflow between firms without a central controller. Corda achieves 
consensus between firms at the level of individual deals, not the level of the system. 
Corda’s design directly enables regulatory and supervisory observer nodes. Corda 
transactions are validated by parties to the transaction rather than a broader pool of 
unrelated validators. Corda supports a variety of consensus mechanisms… “ 
Corda is thus not a mutual distributed ledger, rather it rather supports bilateral data 
sharing. It also appears from this announcement that the development of Corda is 
putting a lot of emphasis on support for smart contracts, illustrating a further point 
that smart contracts and mutual distributed ledgers are two indepent innovations, not 
facets of the same technology. The adoption of Corda remains yet to be proven, but 
even if it is and so delivers substantial reduction in the costs of manual reconciliation 
of transaction data between firms, this does not sound like the transformation of 
post-trade processes in global capital markets that many involved in the discussion 
of blockchain and settlement envisage. 
Much of the initial interest in Bitcoin has indeed been inspired by a libertarian vision 
of peer-to-peer systems of exchange in which transactions take place without the 
need for either financial intermediaries or government regulation. As we have 
discussed the Bitcoin network is completely open or ‘unpermissioned’. Anyone with 
access to the internet can join the network and acquire coins either by purchase 
using conventional money or by devoting resources to the ‘mining’ used to validate 
transactions. Another way of viewing this is that over 7 billion people on the planet 
are ‘permissioned’ to participate at any time.  This is in stark contrast to conventional 
arrangements where financial institutions make final exchange that settles bank 
payments or the exchange of securities and where detailed checks of identity under 
KYC, AML and other regulations are required in order to open accounts. 
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While a libertarian perspective continues have powerful appeal to many proponents 
of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, almost all financial market participants believe 
that unpermissioned ledgers such as the Bitcoin blockchain can have only limited 
application in capital market transactions. This is for two reasons: regulation and 
efficiency (speed-of-execution and volume constraints). 
Virtually all wholesale financial services are regulated.  The availability of Bitcoin 
protocol and related technologies does not relieve firms of the responsibility to 
comply with all relevant laws and regulations and to properly manage the risks 
arising in their business relationships. It is not possible to allow anyone completely 
free access to the networks that support capital market transactions. Clients and 
their transactions must be subject to KYC and AML scrutiny. Counterparty risk must 
be monitored and managed either bilaterally or through central counterparties.   
Another barrier to applying unpermissioned ledgers employed in Bitcoin and many 
other cryptocurrencies is inefficiency of validation. ‘Unpermissioned’ cryptocurrencies 
must handle participants globally who are not known and for whom there are no legal 
or other institutional arrangements to ensure honest and trustworthy behaviour.  This 
in turn requires validation methods, for example the Bitcoin ‘mining’, that are typically 
slow (varying unpredictably from several seconds to minutes) and resource 
intensive.48  In a permissioned environment, such as a regulated financial market in 
which all participants are subject to approval in order to trade, such inefficient 
validation seems unnecessary.49  
Some form of validation is however absolutely at the heart of financial clearing and 
settlement. The reliable functioning of securities, foreign exchange and derivative 
markets and also domestic payments, rest on minimising uncertainty about the 
completion of transactions. Participants need predictable finality.  If trades are 
delayed, then participants need to be fully informed about the revised time of finality. 
                                            
48 The expense, high level of energy consumption and variable time to confirmation of Bitcoin 
validation by ‘proof of work’ are subjects of considerable controversy. We need not go into fully into 
these controversies here (though Appendix 1 provides some further discussion). Even if ‘proof of 
work’ like that used in Bitcoin was quick and resource efficient, and it seems fairly clear it is not, 
established financial institutions will still prefer a permissioned environment in which  ‘proof of work’ is 
unnecessary. 
49 (Swanson, 2015a) discusses permissioned v. permissionless distributed ledgers further. 
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This means that even if using a permissioned mutual distributed ledger there still 
needs to be some process for ensuring that the different copies of the ledger held on 
all the network nodes are consistent.  If it turns out different copies are not 
consistent, then there needs to be a process (a ‘consensus algorithm’) for eliminating 
inconsistencies over a predictable time frame.   
We should mention the rather sterile debate about whether the mutual distributed 
ledgers being developed by firms such as Digital Asset Holdings, R3 or SETL are 
really true blockchains. The origin of the term blockchain is associated with Satoshi 
Nakamoto’s original paper of 2008 which uses the term block and describes the 
chaining of validated blocks, although not the actual phrase ‘blockchain’.50 The term 
‘blockchain’ has since become standard for describing the arrangements used by 
Bitcoin, in which digitally signed Bitcoin transactions are collected into blocks before 
being subsequently verified as authentic by so called ‘miners’ through a resource 
intensive process known as ‘proof of work’ i.e. mechanically searching to find a 
digital key (a ‘nonce’) which is uniquely associated with the information digitally 
recorded in the block.51  These verified blocks are time ordered, so that each bitcoin 
can be demonstrated as genuine by tracing it’s transaction history back, block by 
block, until locating its genesis block, i.e. the block in which it was first created as a 
reward for Bitcoin mining.52  
                                            
50 “The solution we propose begins with a timestamp server. A timestamp server works by taking a 
hash of a block of items to be timestamped and widely publishing the hash, such as in a 
newspaper or Usenet post [2-5]. The timestamp proves that the data must have existed at the 
time, obviously, in order to get into the hash. Each timestamp includes the previous timestamp in 
its hash, forming a chain, with each additional timestamp reinforcing the ones before it.” (Nakamoto, 
2008, pg 2) 
51 We oversimply somewhat. We understand that a nonce is added but it is not the sole mechanism, 
miners.  Miners will rearrange several attributes (including a nonce) to create entropy such that the 
resulting value is beneath the target difficulty value. 
52 The reason for the mining is to rule out the possibility of malicious network participants collaborating 
to rewrite the transaction history. To do this they would need to find a nonce for an alternative false 
block containing including transactions that are ‘double spends’ and hence divert bitcoins from their 
true owners. This possibility of this ‘forking’ is all but ruled out by the requirement that when there are 
competing chains of blocks, the longest chain takes priority. Thus the probability of a small number of 
miners establishing a false record as definitive and hence be able to double spend their bitcoins is 
small because they will not have enough computing power to do this. A fuller description can be found 
from many sources, e.g. (Narayanan, Bonneau, Felten, Felten, & Goldfeder, 2016) . However there 
are concerns that skilled attackers could still find a way around the security of a public blockchain 
such as Bitcoin – one reason for preferring the additional protection of a permissioned distributed 
ledger. 
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Because of their permissioned structure, the mutual distributed ledgers being 
developed for application in securities settlement do not need to use exactly this 
block structure for verification. While there must still be some mechanism for 
ensuring agreement on the record of transactions in the ledger, this need not require 
a sequential record that can be traced back in time to the point at which securities 
are first entered on the ledger. Even if they are ordered sequentially they do not 
require proof-of-work of the kind employed in the Bitcoin block chain for validation 
because other network participants are trusted. 
A	digression	on	the	efficiency	of	the	Bitcoin	‘proof	of	work’.	
While not directly relevant to our research – since it is clear that any application of 
mutual distributed ledger in financial services will be in a permissioned environment 
that need not use anything similar to the Bitcoin ‘proof of work’ to validate 
transactions – we briefly here summarise two controversies about the resource 
efficiency and reliability of Bitcoin approach to validation (i.e. the mining to find the 
hashes that validate each block in the Bitcoin blockchain).  
The first controversy is about the energy consumption of cryptocurrencies.  (Malmo, 
2015) highlighted a widely circulated but difficult to verify figure that the Bitcoin 
network consumes around 250MW to 500MW around the clock. From this he worked 
out that each Bitcoin transaction uses about the same amount of electricity for 
validation as is required to power the average American home for 1.57 days. 
Previously (O’Dwyer & Malone, 2014) concluded that “currently the entire Bitcoin 
mining network is on par with Ireland for electricity consumption”.  
If true, these figures pose significant questions about long-term transaction costs 
using Bitcoin, and also question its long-term sustainability in environmental 
terms.  There are many ‘clones’ of Bitcoin as well (Wikipedia, 2015 reports that eight 
of these have a market capitalisation of over $10mn – up-to-date capitalisation and 
energy consumption can be found here - http://www.coinwarz.com/cryptocurrency) 
and a variety of other competing approaches to cryptocurrency transactions such as 
Ethereum and Ripple using other validation methods.  Comparative energy 
consumption is an important criterion in deciding how, where, when and which 
cryptocurrency to use. 
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Others dispute the claim that electricity consumption and per transaction dollar costs 
of the Bitcoin network are anything like this high. One consideration is that measured 
in watts/gigahash-second (W/Gh-S) mining efficiency has dramatically improved with 
the introduction of ASICs (application specific integrated circuits) for mining.53 The 
home PCs that were first used for BitCoin mining when the Network launched in 
2009 ran at 650 W/Gh-S, first generation ASICs at 10 W/Gh-S.  Today rates of 0.7 
W/Gh-S or even more are achievable from machines sold retail for individuals who 
want to try Bitcoin mining.54 At the same time successful mining is increasingly being 
undertaken by a small number of industrial scale miners, financed by substantial 
venture capital, who are reportedly able to achieve efficiencies of 0.025 W/Gh-S or 
better.55  
These dramatic gains in processing efficiency are not however the whole story. The 
problem is that as the efficiency of legitimate mining improves, so does the efficiency 
of any ‘rogue’ miners using the latest generation ASIC machines to try and validate a 
false transaction block e.g. one in which Bitcoins are used for a second time and 
diverted away from their true owners, the very problem that validation through mining 
is meant to prevent. To counter rogue mining the Bitcoin network adjusts the 
difficulty of the hash rate to ensure that the average time for the validation of a new 
block remains at around 10 minutes. As mining efficiency improves so does the 
difficulty of finding a number that validates a block with no net saving in electricity. 
The integrity of Bitcoin depends on validation being expensive, in order to ensure 
that the resource required by a rogue miner to validate a false block costs more than 
the benefit form misdirected Bitcoin.  
The resulting ‘arms race’ has resulted in an extraordinary increase in the hash rate 
for the entire Bitcoin network.56 Whereas in January 2011 the entirety of mining 
                                            
53 A hash is an attempt by a miner using trial and error to find a nonce that solves the required 
cryptographic puzzle and hence validates a transaction block. A giga-hash is 109 hashes. So an 
mining efficiency of 1 watt/gigahash-second means a miner will need to consume electricity at a rate 
of 1 W/sec or 3.6KW/hr in order to make 109 attempts every second at finding a nonce or key that 
validates the transaction block.  
54 Based on the highest performance machines advertised on Ebay e.g. 
http://www.ebay.com/gds/Best-ASIC-Miners-/10000000205733242/g.html 
55 See (Coindesk, 2015b) for discussion of one such industrial scale miner. 
56 Blockchain.info https://blockchain.info/charts/hash-rate  Blockchain.info 
https://blockchain.info/charts/hash-rate  
 59 
 
operations in the Bitcoin network were conducted at a rate of around 1,000 
gigahashes per sec (Gh-s); by January 2012 this had risen to around 10,000 Gh-s; 
by January 2015 to around 5,000,000 Gh-s and by March 2016 to over 
1,200,000,000 Gh-s, i.e. each second there were more than 1018 trial and error 
attempts to find a nonce that validates a Bitcoin block. At 1 watt per Gh/s this works 
out to a power consumption for the Bitcoin network of around 1,200 MW. This is 
28,800 MWh each day, or about 10,500 GWh per year. This is a bit less than half of 
Ireland’s 26,100 GWh per year.57  Note, this focuses only on the mining and ignores 
other energy consumption in networks and routers.  The most efficient miners though 
are probably already operating at closer to 0.1. If the entire network achieved this 
efficiency total electricity consumption will be 120 MW about 1,050 GWh per year, or 
a little less than the annual electricity consumption of Swaziland. 
Actual consumption is probably somewhere between these extremes, since some 
inefficient miners still make sufficient profit to keep mining. Suppose the Bitcoin 
network uses the intermediate consumption rate of 200MW around the clock which 
works out at 4,800 MWh per day or approximately 1.7 GWh per year.58 This is about 
one fiftieth of the annual electricity consumption of Belgium in 2008 and close to the 
2008 annual electricity consumption of Senegal. The electricity consumption of 
BitCoin mining is therefore high, even if not quite as high as some have suggested. 
The same assumptions can also be used to generate an electricity cost per-
transaction. Thus 4,800 MW hours per day in the Bitcoin network applied to 100,000 
daily transactions implies that each transaction requires approximately 50 KW hours 
of electricity for validation. At the cheap wholesale electricity rate available to the 
biggest and most efficient China based miners of 5¢ per KW hour that works out at 
$2.50 per transaction.  
                                            
57 All individual country electricity consumption figures are from the CIA as reported in (Wikipediia, 
2015) 
58 (Croman et al., 2016) using a slightly more detailed analysis arrive at a similar estimate of 200MW 
electricity consumption for the entire Bitcoin network and an electricity cost of $3.6 per transaction. 
They also estimate hardware costs arriving at a total per transaction cost of $6.1. These estimates are 
though upper bounds, depending on the efficiency of throughput. Lower bound including hardware is 
as low as $1.4 per transaction. See their Table 1. 
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This can be compared with an estimate of revenues per transaction Total ‘mining’ 
revenues are currently about 3,600 newly created Bitcoins per day – which at current 
market price of Bitcoin of close to $400 are worth approximately $400 x 3,600 = 
$1.44mn for 100,000 daily transactions. Thus the mining revenues across the entire 
network work from creation of new Bitcoins work out at $14 per transaction (this 
ignores any additional revenues from transaction fees paid by Bitcoin users). Thus 
the most efficient miners (whose electricity costs are even lower, but who are 
spending a lot on hardware) are making substantial per transaction profits (but face 
the problem that their expensive hardware is rapidly falls behind the efficiency 
frontier as even more powerful ASIC machines are developed and employed on 
industrial scale).  
Note though that the reward for a successful proof of work is set to keep halving as 
the number of Bitcoins increases, from 25 Bitcoins per block to 12.5 (this is dues to 
take place in mid-2016) and then from 12.5 to 6.25 per block (this is projected to 
happen in about 3 years from now).  
The second and more recent controversy – one on which we have spent relatively 
little time – surrounds governance problems that have emerged over the past few 
months in the Bitcoin network. Our summary draws mainly on (Belshe, 2016; 
Hagelstrom, 2016; Palmer, 2016).  
These governance problems have emerged because of a technical problem with 
Bitcoin. A block size limit of 1MB hardcoded into the original Bitcoin software has in 
recent months started to cause transaction delays. We understand that the 1MB limit 
places a theoretical maximum of around 300,000 Bitcoin transactions per day, but 
that delays emerge at lower transaction rates because they are not evenly spaced 
around the 24 hours of the day. Since the launch of Bitcoin it has taken 
approximately 10 minutes for payments to be initially validated (the average time for 
block validation, although for complete finality it is necessary to wait until six blocks 
have been successively validated i.e. one hour, in order to avoid the possibility of the 
most recent blocks in the chain being replaced by a longer fork). Now however as 
transactions volumes have risen they are instead often being queued for up to 10 
hours at busy times because miners are already tackling the maximum block size 
and must put additional transactions on hold.  
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One interim solution has been prioritisation of payments that are willing to pay a 
‘transaction fee’ to miners and hence incentivising miners to place them earlier in 
queues for inclusion in blocks. But even those paying such transaction fees are 
suffering delays.  
The reason this is a governance problem is that the decentralised nature of Bitcoin 
makes it difficult to agree and co-ordinate a change in software for the entire 
network, in this case for example replacing the old version with the lower 1MB block 
size limit with a newer version with a higher limit. There is disagreement about 
whether there should be a maximum block size at all, what that maximum should be 
and whether an increase in block size is indeed the best way to resolve the current 
problem of transaction delays. A key concern is excessive centralisation. Larger 
block sizes could favour a small number of large miners, although in practice such 
centralisation is already happening anyway. There are also concerns about 
computational efficiency with large block sizes. As a result not all Bitcoin network 
participants agree on how to deal with this technical problem. 
Bitcoin does allow the software to evolve. It is possible for two versions to run 
alongside each other, compatibly (a so called ‘soft fork’) and once 75% of nodes 
adopt this then becomes the new software that is used by all. A first attempt at a new 
version, Bitcoin-XT incorporating an eventual increase in the block size limit to 8MB, 
failed because it did not attract sufficient uptake. A more recently released coding 
Bitcoin Classic, which increases the blocksize to only 2MB looks to have a better 
chance of acceptance. There are though other proposed solutions not involving an 
increase in block size, notably ‘Segregated Witness’ (which reduces the information 
that needs to be incorporated in each transaction thus allowing more transactions 
within a given maximum block size) and ‘Lightening Fork’ (which seeks to provide a 
‘side chain’ that takes smaller Bitcoin payments off the Bitcoin network). 
The debate on which solution should be adopted to deal with this technical problem 
has become acrimonious and sometimes personal (for example with accusations of 
serving certain vested interests). A lot of emotion has been expressed about the 
possibility of a ‘hard fork’ that Bitcoin might split into two incompatible systems. 
Likely that one solution will eventually win out, without such a hard fork, but this does 
not guarantee that similar governance problems do not emerge in the future. 
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Why	is	there	considered	to	be	so	much	potential	value	from	the	application	
of	distributed	ledgers	in	financial	services?	
We here mention a few of the sources that have shaped our perceptions and the 
framing of our hypotheses. Much valuable and technical practical insight can be 
gained from Richard Gendal Brown’s blog http://gendal.me/  (Gendal Brown is now 
chief technology officer at R3). One contrast he draws (in Brown, 2015a of 15th Aug 
and Brown, 2015b of 26th Aug)(in Brown, 2015a of 15th Aug and Brown, 2015b of 
26th Aug)  is between two contrasting cultures in the debates about blockchain and 
finance. One is a security engineering perspective, driven by fear of technical failure 
and prioritising the need to ensure cryptographic security and immunity from external 
attack. The other, typical of the operational functions in large organisations such as 
banks, takes a different engineering perspective driven instead by fear of practical 
failure. As he writes: 
“I often argue for the importance of blockchain and distributed ledger technology by 
using the following chain of logic: 
Bitcoin’s architecture solved the problem of censorship-resistant digital cash 
But few, if any, financial firms are interested in censorship-resistant digital cash. So 
why are they looking at this technology? 
Because some principles underpinning Bitcoin’s architecture – shared ledgers, for 
example – could be relevant to problems that banks face. 
Sure, a blockchain or a replicated shared ledger could indeed be useful to banks. 
Perhaps it could reduce the need for reconciliation between firms if they all ran off a 
single ledger, for example. But this says nothing about whether blockchains are 
the optimal solution to any particular problem in banking.  That still has to be argued, 
of course.” 
This distinction is well worth keeping in mind in the debates about blockchain and its 
applications in finance. The original Bitcoin blockchain is an elegant solution to a 
particular problem, the exchange of digital claims on value in an environment with no 
institutional constraints on the behaviour of network participants and where strong 
cryptographic protection is required against the possibility of malicious behaviour.  
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While there is agreement across the industry that many current processes are 
unnecessarily inefficient and these inefficiencies could be substantially reduced by 
adopting some form of shared ledgers, there is a huge amount still to be done to 
agree on the details. We have further argued in this paper that integration with 
existing business processes and legacy systems will be a crucial challenge for the 
effective adoption of distributed ledger in securities.  
A persuasive statement about the potential benefits of applying distributed ledger to 
security settlement is provided in an online talk from the 2015 SIBOS conference by 
Blythe Masters, the chief executive of Digital Asset Holdings. She says: 
“What exactly is a distributed ledger? Simply put these are shared, replicated and 
decentralised transaction networks based on open-source internet protocol that draw 
on cryptographic techniques to secure the information that is recorded on those 
ledgers; a technology that has grown out of innovations in internet bandwidth, 
computing power and the science of cryptography. What does a shared distributed 
ledger really mean especially in the financial services context? Well what it means is 
that instead of each independent party to financial transactions keeping their own 
independent and private record of transaction information independently, instead 
there can be one master prime record or if you will golden record of the truth relating 
to a transaction history that acts as a single source of information to multiple different 
and independent parties as opposed to the status quo today where everyone 
essentially maintains their own ledger of activity.  
When different parties record the same transaction information  inevitably this leads 
to inconsistencies and enormous amounts of effort, time and cost are put into 
subsequent reconciliation of these different sources of what should ultimately be the 
same data, being reconciled and addressing the errors and inconsistencies that 
result.  … In the event that parties are able with confidence to share the same 
transactions record, and can share that transaction record and agree its validity at 
the inception of that transactions record then there is an enormous opportunity to 
reduce errors, reduce the time spent addressing and resolving those errors and it 
means that that same data can be accessed in real time and in a secure fashion at 
different locations, in different time zone and by different entities. The opportunity for 
efficiency gain here is truly quite breath-taking.  
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This also means the entire life cycle of a transaction including its execution 
subsequent netting, reconciliation of facts by the different parties that need to know, 
the buyer, the seller, their agents, the custodian, the central securities depository, a 
regulator for example, all those entities can rely on the same single source of 
information and agree on the validity of that transaction at the point when it is 
submitted for settlement rather than later in the process and after the fact…. 
The opportunities that we are talking are themselves significant because the markets 
that we are talking about are themselves gigantic, they are measured typically in the 
billions and trillions of dollars notional with the consequence that the benefit of 
reducing inefficiencies results in very large dollar cost savings measured well into the 
billions of dollars per annum and perhaps more important than the cost saving is the 
reduction of risk associated with being able to complete transactions in near real 
time after they have been agreed rather than allowing for lengthy delays during 
which time errors and inconsistencies in transaction records have to be addressed.”  
(Masters, 2015, our transcription) 
While agreeing with Masters about the huge potential for reducing both costs and 
risks from using mutual distributed ledgers, our research findings highlight the 
substantial challenges involved in adapting existing business processes and 
integrating them with these new technologies.  
Another valuable resource from the 2015 SIBOS conference is the Innotribe debate 
“New Kids on the Block(chain) platform” (available on YouTube (SWIFT, 2015b)). 
This hour long session presents a wide range of views on the potential applications 
of blockchain in finance, with contributions ranging from providers of cryptographic 
distributed ledger solutions, through start-up firms seeking to employ these new 
methods (in microfinance and securities settlement) to major banks. Perhaps the 
biggest point of agreement is that practical application is still some way off, one 
contributor for example arguing that we are looking still at 12-18 months of 
exploration, seeking to define practical needs, before crystallising on particular 
solutions. There is also a degree of scepticism about whether securities settlement 
presents the most obvious use case, that first application may well be in other 
financial applications.  
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A further useful document, amongst the many we have reviewed, is the World 
Economic Forum report on how disruptive innovations are reshaping financial 
services (World Economic Forum, 2015). This report – the fruit of 15 months of work 
based on interviews with around two hundred industry leaders and technical experts 
and fifty or so workshops – provides both overview and detail about the prospects for 
technical change in global financial services. While commenting on the near real-
time settlement of payments achieved by decentralised digital payment and transfer 
solutions – they highlight Bitcoin, Ripple, Litecoin and Namecoin – they devote 
relatively little space to the discussion of distributed ledger or securities settlement.  
What they do is identify six areas of financial activity where substantial technology 
driven change is occurring (Payments including decentralised digital payments and 
transfers, Insurance, Deposits and Lending, Capital raising including crowdfunding, 
Investment Management, and finally Capital Markets). The World Economic Forum 
is following up this project with a stream of work on distributed ledger technologies 
(see World Economic Forum, 2016), with some initial meetings around the January 
2016 Davos forum, indicating their awareness of the substantial potential impact of 
this technology on financial services. Still there is no obvious reason from their work 
to date for thinking that the first successful financial applications of distributed ledger 
technologies will be to the settlement of securities in the major financial markets. i.e. 
our Hypothesis 2 about piecemeal development for establishing proof of concept 
could mean that securities settlement is far from being the first use case. 
More	cautious	perspectives	and	the	case	for	co‐ordinated	and	collaborative	
change	
Two other recent reports seem to us to provide sensible and cautious appraisals of 
the new technology and challenge of practical business implementation in global 
financial markets. (Euroclear & Oliver Wyman, 2016) pose the question of what 
‘utopia’ would look like if we were starting with a blank sheet of paper and designing 
processes in capital markets without any of the constraints of legacy systems or 
existing business practice. They summarise this utopia as follows (pg 9): 
 “The record of each security would be held on a flat accounting basis - that is, with 
multiple levels of beneficial ownership in a single ledger. There would be no need to 
operate data normalisation, reconcile internal systems, or agree exposures and 
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obligations. We would have standardised processes and services, shared reference 
data, standardised processing capabilities (such as reconciliations), near real time 
data and improved understanding of counterparty worthiness. For privileged 
participants such as regulators, we would have transparent data on holdings, among 
many other improvements.”  
They also consider how such a utopia might be implemented suggesting that this 
could be achieved with a relatively small number of mutual distributed ledgers, one 
for cash, on for securities, one for derivatives, plus one for funds and one for 
collateral pledged for margining (their Figure 3).  
(Euroclear & Oliver Wyman, 2016) go on to consider the practical hurdles to 
adoption (pgs 14-15). In their view while there are some technological challenges still 
to be met, in order to demonstrate the scalability that will be needed to support 
global capital market transactions, most of these hurdles are business and 
institutional. Law and regulation will need to accommodate and this will in some 
cases require new primary legislation, for example in the definition of the finality of 
settlement or regulations on the physical location of data. In their view a ‘multiple 
skeleton key’ approach may be also needed, allowing courts, regulators and others 
to view data and where appropriate enforce change of ownership without compliance 
by the existing owner, and also to securely managing anonymity and identity reliably, 
according to clearly stated and agreed rules. The industry will also have to develop 
effective common standards and governance for the mutual distributed ledgers and 
carefully manage the operational and business risks associated with migration. 
The rest of their report considers the pathways to adoption, identifying a number of 
specific applications where this might take place first (they suggest pre-IPO 
securities trades, syndicated loans, depository receipts, KYC data sharing, collateral 
ledgers for margining, book running and fund portfolio management) with 
subsequent application to holding pricing data, market surveillance, securities 
servicing and regulatory reporting (Euroclear & Oliver Wyman, 2016 Figure 5) and 
suggesting that adoption will come about through a combination of displacement by 
start-up challengers (though many will fail), accommodation by incumbents (In their 
phrasing ‘collaboration’) and finally mandated uptake by regulators and law makers. 
Overall they believe that some initial proof of concept in limited test cases can be 
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expected over the next 24 months, that disruptive uptake in some areas of 
application (substantial in small less development markets, narrow in larger markets) 
taking 2-5 years and then broadening adoption and widespread agreement on 
standards and replacement of legacy systems taking  from 5 to 10 years out, and 
mass adoption in 10+ years (Euroclear & Oliver Wyman, 2016 Figure 7).  
An even more cautiously realistic view is provided by a recent DTCC white paper on 
the adoption of mutual distributed ledgers in global capital markets (DTCC, 2016). 
They emphasise the long and substantial effort involved in developing the current 
system of securities transactions (pg 2), which while certainly complex and arguably 
inefficient “…provides the necessary stability, reliability and certainty that ensure 
global markets are efficient, transparent and cost effective.”  Like us they argue (pg 
3) that “…modernizing current practices and laws to enable real-time settlement are 
not dependent on the use of blockchain technologies.” i.e. reducing settlement time 
is a business process not a technology challenge.  
As suggested by their title ‘Embracing Disruption’ (DTCC, 2016) see a lot of potential 
value in mutual distributed ledgers, in addressing particular problems such as: 
reconciliation (multiple versions of the truth in siloed layers of the financial system); 
technological vulnerabilities (such as exposure to cyber-attacks); unnecessary 
complexity requiring frequent manual intervention in business processes; and better 
suited to 24 hour, 7 days a week, 365days a year trading. But like us they also note 
limitations to distributed ledger technologies, including lack of integration with 
existing systems for data management and retrieval, the technical trade-offs in 
moving from centralised to decentralised processing (notably latency, as well as 
challenges of making these systems conform with national data privacy laws) and in 
a useful terminology the continued need for third parties to manage the ‘trust 
boundary’, for example ensuring that any off ledger assets (represented on the 
ledger but with physical of legal presence off ledger) are properly secured and the 
proper onboarding of ledger participants. 
In sharp contrast to (Euroclear & Oliver Wyman, 2016), (DTCC, 2016) are sceptical 
about whether any significant uptake of distributed ledger will come through 
challenger initiatives. They rather take the view (pg 11) that “…this is a generational 
opportunity to reimagine the financial industry infrastructure, and this can only be 
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accomplished from a well-considered, collaborative, design approach.” and 
emphasise (pg 10) the need for co-ordination “Achieving this goal will require a 
collaborative rearchitecture of core industry processes and practices that were built 
over many decades, each somewhat differently and all requiring reconciliation with 
previous and subsequent systems. A collaborative industry modernization program 
that includes distributed ledger technology could reduce the process steps required 
for financial transactions and improve the security and resiliency of the remaining 
processing systems, thereby reducing costs and risks of transaction failure.” 
 
Another dose of realism was provided by the January 2016 Blockchain Conference 
in San Francisco by IBM Global Blockchain Offering Director John Wolpert (we here 
rely on the report of this speech by Rizzo, 2016). Wolpert argued that many early 
blockchain implementations are ‘first generation’ implementations that suffer from 
deficiencies that will hold back their appeal to businesses. He emphasised the need 
for further development which he anticipates taking place through open-source 
development, most importantly the recently launched Hyperledger project of the 
Linux Foundation in which IBM but also R3, Digital Assets, SWIFT, ABN Amro, the 
CME Group and several others are participating (a later annouuncement after the 
Wolpert speech confirmed the participation of 30 founding members and code-
sharing arrangements to promote the development of blockchain technology came 
after the Wolpert speech, see Linux Foundation, 2016). 
 
An indication of the appeal of blockchain, revealed by Wolpert, is that when the 
Hyperledger project was first announced in December 2015, some 2,300 companies 
enquire about being part of the project. As reported by (Rizzo, 2016), Wolpert argues 
that "You need a fabric that allows for lots of competition on platforms and huge 
competition on solutions. We need to evolve the Internet to become economically 
aware and this Internet is not going to be an application, it will be a fabric." and 
concluded that "It’s either going to be a holy mess or it’s going to change the world." 
 
To conclude, our reading of the current state of industry debate is that – while there 
is huge interest in distributed ledger technologies in a wide range of financial 
services and other applications – the practical ways forward are as yet far from clear.  
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To quote again from Richard Gendal-Brown: 
 “…don’t assume that today’s blockchain platforms (permissioned or permissionless) 
are the (whole) answer, then surely we’re back in the land of engineering, 
architecture and hard work? Perhaps this means that the combination of persistence, 
data models, APIs, consensus, identity and other components that we need won’t all 
come from one firm.  So a common language, some common vision and an ability to 
collaborate may become critical. Where is your distinct differentiation? Where would 
you fit in an overall stack?” (Brown, 2015b)   
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Appendix	2. Record	of	Focus	Group	Meeting	of	25th	Nov,	2015	
This meeting was held under the Chatham House rule, i.e. all views are reportable 
but not attributable without permission.  
Initial	discussion	
Before addressing the three hypotheses there was a lively discussion about the 
factors driving interest in mutual distributed ledgers.  As one participant put it: what 
would arrangements for settlement look like if we started with a ‘blank piece of 
paper? We certainly would not have them as they are. But there needs to be a push 
for change. The switch out of paper based processing forty years ago came about 
because existing ways of doing things “just became too painful”. That’s why it was 
ended. Are we reaching a similar situation today? 
A central point is the level of costs that are passed on to customers. A recent study 
by Oliver Wyman suggests that the global industry devotes around $65-$80bn cost 
to post trade processing (although not everyone in the room accepted that the costs 
are quite so high).  But it is not just about cost, it is also about security and certainty.  
What is the underlying challenge? There is multiple mirroring of information. The 
problem is structural. Huge effort is devoted to reconciliation. There is recognition of 
how much information is there and could be made available and used but is locked 
and has to be released. We need to substitute the complex with the simple. 
Technology allows new approaches.  The global LEI is one example of success, but 
only one step. 
Incremental change may not work, what is required is a whole new approach. How 
can we collectively change? Any proposed evolutionary path must be seen in this 
context. One major interest group is those who are really bearing the costs, i.e. fund 
administrators and behind them final investors, so we need to get them to influence 
the decisions of the intermediaries. Many of the data and operational costs are not in 
settlement per se but in corporate actions and fund management. Complicated but a 
key opportunity. 
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While agreed that ‘multiple versions of the truth’ we have to recognise that with such 
a huge problem this also means that there is a great deal to change. Executing such 
major change if far from straightforward. Two examples: T2S in Europe, took several 
years to execute, and the switch from T+3 to T+2 in the UK took a huge effort over 
more than a year. It is the management of change in business process around the 
technology, not the technology itself. What is needed is leadership. 
The case for change will not be based just on short term commercial benefit.  
Someone needs to be wearing the diplomat’s hat. We need discussion and 
negotiation and a lot of challenging of ourselves. The appetite for change is real but 
far from easily achieved.  
Discussion	of	Hypotheses	
Hypothesis 1. Any mutual distributed ledger settlement of securities purchases 
(or other transactions in public financial markets) will need to use a 
‘permissioned’ ledger, in which only a limited number of approved network 
participants can propose updates of the ledger and participate in verification. 
This contrasts with permissionless mutual distributed ledgers (of which the 
‘Bitcoin Blockchain’ is the leading example) where anyone can join the 
network and all have equal rights to propose updates to the ledger and 
participate in verification. 
Discussion then moved to this first hypothesis. One observations on hypothesis 1 is 
that the issue is not “either/ or” there are several degrees of participation. Similarly 
we need to distinguish our concepts carefully.  Do we mean ‘permissioned’ or 
‘authenticated’?  Are we using a network simply for transfer of value, authenticated 
and validated, or is it supporting other functions?  
There are many long standing examples of shared networks without central storage. 
In this respect mutual distributed ledgers are far from new. The internet is based on 
https and certification i.e. it is ‘authenticated’. This is content independent, whatever 
it is can be wrapped using public/ private key PKI. Another example is SWIFT, also a 
shared backbone. There are any commonalities (for example open v. closed i.e. who 
can read it but not action it.) 
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The novelty in modern mutual distributed ledger is the added value of the supporting 
cryptography. It offers completely secure differentiation of administrative privileges 
and participation. All of this can be included in a configuration file. This allows great 
flexibility: two man days not person years to reorganize the arrangement of a 
system. But this needs getting policies clear from the outset in order to allow 
cryptography to do the heavy lifting.   
This prominence now given to cryptography is closely related to the huge changes in 
data storage and data access. 15 years ago hardware was in its own datacenter. 
Now we are using the cloud and configuring data access and verification. One 
possibility for example is having regulators as nodes on the network, with 
appropriate permissioning to ensure compliance with confidentiality and other legal 
requirements.  
Several raised concerns about responsibility and accountability. It must be crystal 
clear who ‘owns’ failure and this creates the need for permissioning. Are we dealing 
with nodes that we trust?  One possibility is a small group with common interest and 
approaches such as clearing members of a CCP. Or are we dealing with a much 
more diverse community. What is the role of verification? 
 
While most agreed with the basic premise of Hypothesis 1, i.e. the need limitation on 
participation, one participant emphasized the need to balance technical innovation 
against what is tightly controlled and regulated. A key is getting this balance right. In 
wholesale transactions, agreed there will always be a relatively small group of 
participants but retail is much more diverse. In both contexts we should expect 
‘bifurcation’, with relatively novel activities operating in a lighter regime with less 
control.  
 
One participant notes the confusion that arises when we conflate ‘nodes’ of the 
network with businesses. There are groups within businesses. This is of course an 
opportunity, to use common services and unify data. But what is the form of 
verification that ensures proper and appropriate access?   
 
This is also a regulatory dimension. What will make the regulators comfortable? 
There are different units of regulation within the firm? There are ‘Chinese’ walls 
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within firms. Custody business is separate from the broker-dealer. And legal entities 
matter, we should set this up so that failure or divestment can be handled in an 
orderly. In short there are a whole series of implications and uses that need to be 
taken into account.  
Another participant recounted experience of international payments networks which 
suggests that the simplest challenge is the technology. The bigger and more 
complicated challenge is incorporating the business and legal aspects. You have got 
to keep these people happy. They have to be comfortable. This will require a 
permissioned environment (legal will always insist on this). But it is also a business 
issue, for example does the ledger allow corporate clients to be nodes as well? If so 
am I allowing my clients to disintermediate me?  
Conclusion we are looking at something highly structured that needs to be carefully 
and clearly thought through. The choice about permissioning is not a simple yes/no 
or in/out decision. There are a wide range of possibilities about access and 
administrative privileges for a wide range of potential participants. So while the 
hypothesis is essentially correct a great deal of careful thought needs to go into 
determining the permissioning environment and ensuring the flexibility for changing 
and updating when necessary. 
Hypothesis 2. The initial applications of mutual distributed ledger will be based 
on piecemeal developments, in specific situations where there is no 
established centralised security depository for recording ownership. A 
coordinated and widespread change in operational processes across all the 
major public markets for equities, bonds and other financial assets will only be 
possible in the relatively far-off future, once technical feasibility is established 
in more limited contexts. 
Hypothesis 1 (subject to clarification of the detail) was broadly accepted by 
participants. In contrast on Hypotheses 2 there were fundamental disagreements.  
The huge amount of attention now being paid to blockchain, and the money being 
put into this by major institutions (for example the 42 banks that have now invested 
in R3CEV), indicates that many are expecting more than just piecemeal change. At 
stake are big issues, about a new operational model across assets and markets.  
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One suggested homely market comparison was between shopping trolleys v. 
checkout. There can be considerable freedom around the shopping trolley, anyone 
can fill it with whatever they like, but there must be complete certainty and a 
standardised process for checkout. It is always about pay, exchange and record. 
This though raises questions. Are there many containers (trolleys) or different types 
of container? Are we using a single asset register or multiple asset registers?  
Another issue is that today the challenges are different from a couple of decades 
ago. There are now almost no lags in the ‘stove pipe’. But we have ended up with a 
lot of fragmentation. Different products like commodities or structured products are 
treated quite differently from other products such as securities.  
Piecemeal sounds of course more practical but initial applications must be 
sustainable. For this first adopters need to recommend and to reuse. Another major 
use case, far from piecemeal, is adoption by firms to harmonise data and systems 
across their entire group. Lehman’s failure was a critical moment, the realisation that 
Lehman had hundreds of subsidiaries and so did their counterparties and no-one 
could work out their exposure. Global LEI is a start but does not get anywhere near 
to complete the challenge of fully monitoring exposures. 
There is a key role for standards. Without standardisation widespread adoption of 
piecemeal initiatives will be a challenge. Financial standards can be either 
descriptive or prescriptive. Financial Services are good on descriptive standard i.e. is 
‘this is what we do’. But they have not succeeded in agreeing on product standards. 
We need the equivalent for a ‘container’ for a security, so that settlement becomes a 
totally streamlined process. We need agreement in this key area of development.  
In reality the application of blockchain in financial markets will be at the same time 
both piecemeal and co-ordinated. We need examples, piecemeal development that 
gets around constraints and demonstrates ‘proof of concept’. Where there is the 
biggest pain is where we will find the fastest adoption, because it is solving a 
problem. But we also need broad co-ordinated change to enable adoption. 
Agreed, but we should understand and learn from history. FIX provides some 
insightful examples. As a successful trade messaging standard (FIX) required a few 
key firms, a core group to get together and pioneer. Otherwise development was 
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supported by clear benefits e.g. An example is the development of FIX 4.1J for 
Japan to provide a solution to the millennium bug.  
There was a short discussion of the technical constraints in applying mutual 
distributed ledger across the board. Clear that the basic function of exchange of 
value and ownership across a mutual distributed ledger can be handled extremely 
rapidly. The discussion of hypothesis 1 suggests that with an appropriate 
configuration of authorisation and permissioning, this can be done consistent with 
required legal, regulatory and security requirements. The bigger technical question is 
around the development of mutual distributed ledgers that do more than just record 
value and ownership, but incorporate further algorithmic processing (e.g. the virtual 
machines incorporated into Ethereum). The interest here surrounds ‘smart contracts’ 
that might automate the execution of legal obligations. But there are many potential 
pitfalls e.g. the possibility of malware, the challenge of demonstrating legal 
compliance, the possibility of indeterminate outcomes. We still need to establish 
whether the future will be more limited capability in order to support speed and 
certainty. 
One major practical challenge where mutual distributed ledger may offer big payoffs 
is with KYC, who are these persons we are dealing with? Ideally this should be 
shared information. Indeed digital identity is at the heart of these discussions. The 
‘distributed’ nature of the ledger is not the key issue.  
An order book is a mutual distributed ledger. We have been doing distributed data 
piecemeal in financial services for 20 years. Security and trust are the central issues 
and really nothing else. Becomes centrally important when we as a community using 
a resource together.  
This in turn implies a redefinition of shared services including in AML, KYC. This 
though takes us back to ensuring that there is compliance with the required by law 
and regulation. A key requirement is being able to say who is accountable?  
But there are different views about how far this sharing can go. One example is 
‘standard settlement instructions’ SSIs. The key is trust. Is the distributed information 
community shareable? KYC/AML are the basics that can be shared, but not so easy 
to share what is commercially value added.  The application of mutual distributed 
 76 
 
ledger is in opportunities for offering the most trusted shared service which provides 
value to all.  
Back to fragmentation. We need to focus on data. There are lots of costs in 
duplication and in reconciliation. First we need leading firms, e.g. SWIFT, to define 
the size and coverage of the container. Second we need reference data. We still 
don’t have an agreed security identifier, firms need to stitch together at least five 
different schema, nothing connects.   
This is a co-ordination issue. 10-15 firms working together can solve a problem. 
Take one step at a time, but not just SSIs, there is a lot there.  
KYC and AML is a relatively simple action. We need to look at activity (trade 
settlement, corporate actions) and the data needed to support that. This is not easy. 
The ‘Single stock record’ failed. A good deal of time and money wasted.  
Could you use mutual distributed ledger across a firm? Again the challenge here is 
that we are not just discussing transfers of tokens between accounts. The Bitcoin 
blockchain does not incorporate any semantic definitions. At least potentially other 
more flexible ledgers, incorporating virtual machines, can capture a lot more.  
R3 are a natural group to look to, but are they really ready to address this co-
ordination challenge? They do not yet seem to be defining standards or indeed 
wanting to take that role.   
There is a tension here between piecemeal and co-ordinated. Is it worth the effort to 
define requirements and then ensure they are met across the piece? An example is 
the goal of shifting from T+2 to T+0.  But there is always an element of liquidity risk, 
maybe we can move to T+ 15 minutes but we still need a process of verification to 
confirm that settlement is possible. 
Structural issue not just about ‘arrangements’. To raise one issue, what is a CSD 
and what do they do? The CSD can check the trade and link participants and run 
delivery vs. payment. But we need a lot around all of that, a whole lot of stuff to make 
users comfortable. Technically settlement is very easy, once stock and credit lines 
are in place, the discussion around SSIs etc. is ensuring that.  
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One participant noted that the investment management association IMA is beginning 
to look at blockchain. This could be very important since up until now the buyside 
has not yet taken as much interest as the sell side firms, but this could change in the 
months to come. 
Overall conclusion: Applying mutual distributed ledger in financial markets is far from 
being just a technology challenge or a technology fix. To make this work will require 
wide ranging adjustment in business process, ensuring that firms adopt common 
approaches and where necessary changing the way things are done. This is 
moreover not limited to the post-trade clearing and settlement. It will affect the whole 
range of back and middle office functions in buy-side and sell-side institutions. So 
while, absolutely, there has to proof of concept through successful demonstration in 
specific areas of applications, the issue is not just demonstrating technical feasibility 
but rather achieving the necessary co-ordination in the adaption of business 
processes. This is an industry wide challenge that will require leadership, not just 
piecemeal effort. And it will be essential to involve both sides of the market, buy side 
as well as sell side, together with regulators. 
Hypothesis 3. At present current participants in the settlement cycle carry out a 
bundled set of functions (verification of ownership, preparation for exchange 
including associated borrowing of securities or cash, delivery of value against 
payment) using historically developed arrangements (tiered accounts, 
fungibility of securities ownership). Obtaining the benefits from the application 
of mutual distributed ledger to securities settlement will require a substantial 
reengineering of these arrangements in which the positioning for settlement 
must be carried out prior to trade. 
This third hypothesis turns out to be much more closely related to Hypotheses 2 than 
we had originally envisaged. Since co-ordination of business processes is key, the 
issue of whether business process also needs substantial reengineering must be 
addressed upfront not as an afterthought. 
There were again a wide range of views in the room. This part of the meeting also 
included a fairly lengthy discussion of smart contract, going some way beyond 
Hypothesis 3. 
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One view is that that we cannot drop the absolute requirement of needing someone 
to point to when things go wrong. Technology is not so difficult. What needs clarity is 
the business end, middle and back office, custodians, the communication of trade 
and allocation details to fund administrators, there is a whole range of market 
participants and who is responsible for what. 
In terms of improving business process, a major problem has been lack of 
engagement. Achieving “t+X” (whatever X should be), depends on obtaining 
agreement between the buyer and seller. We also have to recognise that various 
asset markets differ, additional or variations in process are often required. 
A further challenge is that “turkeys do not vote for Christmas”. So it may be important 
to be able to offer greenfield alongside existing arrangement. Buyers and sellers 
need to be able to choose between current arrangements for settlement and new 
arrangements based on shared information through mutual distributed ledgers. The 
market can then vote with its feet.  
Over 30 years we will see a new approach. With transactions time, day and event 
stamped. But that is not all. At present what people care about is default. So are we 
to work with no possibility of default i.e. with complete pre-positioning for trade and 
simultaneous settlement? That seems unlikely so there will still be a huge amount of 
detail involved and several potential problems that must be allowed for.   What this 
comes down to is the virtually everyone involved in post-trade processing are 
information providers. Then the question of who is accessing the ledger and seeing 
this information and to what extent this information provides them with certainty. 
A particularly interesting application where change in process may make a big 
difference is the collateral bit.  For example it can be residing in one jurisdiction but 
not legally movable. Today this problem is dealt with through collateral insurance but 
an additional expense. The business can be substantially more efficient by moving 
things better and faster. Here thought the issue is what this really requires, does this 
distributed shared ledger or something else for example greater flexibility in law and 
regulation? 
Business process affects everyone in the market. Even addressing Hypothesis 1, 
deciding the configuration of permissions for access, authentication and verification 
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requires trust. And, as we have discussed in relation to Hypothesis 2, effort is 
needed to harmonise and deal with potential failure. So a vision and master plan is 
needed of how mutual distributed ledger is to be applied and this must be developed 
product by product. Again this a major co-ordination challenge. 
What is the role of R3? This has been discussed at board level in many firms. The 
positive view is that it offers a community, the forty-two institutions involved, so this is 
a powerful and unique selling point. At the same time definitely an ‘out of the money 
call option’. So could be the venue for addressing the issues of business process.  
But not everyone is persuaded that R3 will be the driver of change. Governance is 
critical. The history of alternative trading venues in Europe provides an example. 
Turquoise had most of the major firms on board, but as a result was a tortoise, could 
not do anything without endless discussion. Chi-X with small group of core 
institutions closely involved could move much more quickly and was as result much 
more successful in responding to the needs of the market. Will the same logic not 
apply to the implementation of mutual distributed ledger in financial markets?  
Conclusion: the harmonisation and development of business process cannot be 
separated from the application of shared mutual distributed ledger. To what extent 
this requires fundamental change, e.g. in management of liquidity and collateral, and 
how this will be developed at market level remains to be seen.  
Additional	discussion	of	smart	contracts	
The focus group concluded with some additional discussion of smart contracts. 
These are a means of implementing business logic. But it is still at the very earliest 
stages of development, similar to where databases were in in 1974. A number of 
entities are now using Ethereum virtual machine or the related Eris permissioned 
application which can support embedded code (but these do not integrate with the 
Bitcoin block chain, they may use use alternative consensus mechanism e.g. 
Tendermint implementation of byzantine fault tolerance). There are technical issues 
with these initiatives. Ethereum has not got IF-then etc. no infinite loops. This means 
we can predict definitely what will happen and we believe security cannot be broken 
by malware. But while a start has been could take a decade to build this out. 
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Smart contracts do seem to have natural application in securities settlement.  They 
offer the possibility of transparent technical implementation of what has previous 
been signed up to. This is far from all. Another potential application of smart 
contracts is data recording, internally or in trade repositories. This is not just about 
trade execution and settlement.   
It is tempting to think that all issues of contract and default can be incorporated into 
smart contracts. But this does not seem realistic. Smart contracts are not themselves 
legal contracts. The business works on the basis that we first agree and then later 
we execute, but execution is still conditional.  Smart contracts can be used to 
execute the terms of a trade, but they are not themselves a legal contract. For this 
we need to compile code and establish exactly what it implies. Extremely challenging 
to provide a legal audit to be sure that the smart contract is going to execute what is 
legally. Yes we need code to implement obligations, but we will not be able to see on 
the ledger all the legal commitments which are inevitably context dependent. 
This tells us we must be careful. In some context e.g. ISDA master agreements less 
of a problem. In other situations, involving collateral and cash and hence DVP we 
use a range of different contracts in place. No effective standardisation and few 
reporting requirements except registration. There are other challenges as well, e.g. 
high frequency trading that will not easily slot into any mutual distributed ledger 
based settlement. Scary to think about smart contracts applied e.g. to CDOs. More 
philosophically, financial markets built on “mistrust and leverage”, seems difficult to 
capture such intangibles in code.  
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Appendix	3. List	of	Informants’	Affiliations	
We list here the affiliations of individuals we have engaged with or who have 
commented on a preliminary draft.  In several firms there were multiple individuals.  
Many of the firms with whom our contributors were affiliated do not have an agreed 
view.  Some of our contributors were candid that the prevailing view in their firm was 
sometimes at odds with their own thinking.  A few of those whom we interviewed or 
attended our focus groups wish their organisations to remain anonymous.   
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